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ABSTRACT
Do Auditors Communicate Financial Misstatement Risk in Audit Report? Evidence 
from Subsequent Accounting Restatements in China  
by
YEUNG Hau Yi 
Master of Philosophy 
Regulators worldwide are considering expanding current audit reporting model to include key 
audit matters (KAM). Proponents argue that current audit reports are standardized and 
uninformative to financial statement users. Auditors in current reporting regime can choose to 
add explanatory notes in audit reports, however, few current studies have investigated the 
information content of these explanatory notes. This thesis conducts a textual analysis of 
explanatory notes in auditor reports and examines the predictability of auditors’ explanatory 
notes consisting of both unqualified and qualified opinions in determining the incidence of 
subsequent restatements. I hand collect material accounting restatements disclosed by the 
public companies in China from 2003 to 2017 and obtain modified audit reports from the 
CSMAR database during the period between 2003 and 2015. Based on a sample of 22,850 
firm-years from 2003 to 2015 in China, I find that modified audit opinions, in general, can 
communicate financial misstatement risks, and the probability of such risks increases when the 
type of audit opinion is more severe. I also find that compared with unmodified audit opinion, 
modified ones containing explanatory notes have a higher possibility of subsequently being 
restated. Further, the predictive power is not the same across different types of explanatory 
notes. I have shown that explanatory notes including notes emphasizing contingencies and 
uncertainties and those relating to audit scope limitations have greater predictive power in 
explaining subsequent accounting restatements. My findings are robust with a set of additional 
tests. The findings of this thesis indicate that auditors do communicate financial misstatement 
risks in modified audit opinions (MAOs). Moreover, the findings are consistent with and 
provide evidence to support policy changes in developing new enhanced auditor reports 
introduced by the standard setters in China. 
Keywords: Financial misstatement risk, Accounting restatements, Explanatory notes, 
Modified audit report 


i?
?
CONTENTS
Chapter 1  Introduction ...................................................................... 1
Chapter 2  Institutional Background ................................................. 9
2.1 Audit Reporting Standards in China ................................................................ 9
2.2 Financial Reporting Environment in China versus the U.S. Capital Market . 12
2.2.1 Audit Opinion Types for Public Companies in the United States ........... 12
2.2.2 Audit Opinion Types for Public Companies in China ............................. 14
2.2.3 Financial Reporting Environment in the United States ........................... 15
2.2.4 Financial Reporting Environment in China ............................................ 16
2.2.4.1 The financial reporting incentives of Chinese public companies..... 16
2.2.4.2 CPA Industry and audit quality in China .......................................... 18
2.2.4.3 The regulatory oversight of auditors in China ................................. 19
Chapter 3  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development ........ 22
3.1 Financial Reporting Quality ........................................................................... 22
3.2 Financial Restatements and Audit Quality ..................................................... 23
3.3 Informativeness of Audit Reports .................................................................. 25
3.3 Hypothesis Development ............................................................................... 27
3.3.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) and Restatements in China .............. 28
3.3.2 Explanatory Notes and Financial Misstatement Risks ............................ 30
Chapter 4  Research Design and Data ............................................. 34
4. 1 Research Design ............................................................................................ 34
4.1.1 Test of Hypothesis 1 ................................................................................ 34
4.1.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 ................................................................................ 36
4.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................... 40
4.2.1 Data Sources ............................................................................................ 40
4.2.2 Sample Selection ..................................................................................... 41
4.3 Control Variables ............................................................................................ 42
Chapter 5  Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis ............ 45
5.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) by Year .................................................... 45
ii?
?
5.2 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) by Explanatory Notes ............................. 46
5.3 Audit Opinions and Misstatements ................................................................ 49
5.4 Descriptive Statistics for Variables ................................................................ 50
Chapter 6  Multivariate Results ....................................................... 51
6.1 Association between MAOs and Restatements .............................................. 51
6.2 Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements ......................... 53
6.3 Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements ........................... 56
6.4 Association between Explanatory Notes Conditional on MAOs and 
Restatements ........................................................................................................ 58
6.5 Robustness Tests............................................................................................. 60
6.5.1 Using Alternative Regression Models ..................................................... 60
6.5.2 Partitioning the samples into two subsamples for SOEs and Non-SOEs 61
6.5.3 Focusing on subsamples that without Audit Firm switches .................... 62
6.5.4 Partitioning the samples into two subsamples for Top Ten and Non-Top 
Ten Audit Firms ................................................................................................ 63
Chapter 7  Conclusions and Limitations ......................................... 65
?
APPENDIX ........................................................................................... 68
REFERENCES .................................................................................... 70
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
iii?
?
LIST OF TABLES 
FIGURE 1 Classification of Audit Opinions ........................................................ 76?
TABLE 1 Sample Design ....................................................................................... 77 
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics for Modified Audit Opinions in China ........... 78 
Panel A: Types of MAOs by Year (percentage in parentheses) ............................ 78 
Panel B-I: Two Types of MAOs by Categories of Explanatory Notes ................. 79 
Panel B-II: Four Types of MAOs by Categories of Explanatory Notes ............... 80 
Panel B-III: Two Types of MAOs by Details of Explanatory Notes .................... 81 
Panel B-IV: Four Types of MAOs by Details of Explanatory Notes ................... 83 
TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics for Misstatement ............................................... 86 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Misstatement and Audit Opinion ...................... 86 
Panel B: Misstatement Frequency by Audit Opinion Type .................................. 87 
TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent and Control 
Variables................................................................................................................. 88 
TABLE 5 Association between MAOs and Restatements ................................... 89 
TABLE 6 Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements ............. 91 
TABLE 7 Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements .............. 93 
TABLE 8 Association between Explanatory Notes conditional on MAOs and 
Restatements ........................................................................................................... 95 
TABLE 9 Robustness Check – Using Alternative Regression Models .............. 97 
TABLE 10 Additional Test – Partitioning the samples into two subsamples for 
SOEs and Non-SOEs ... ........................................................................................ 100
TABLE 11 Additional Test – Using Subsample without Auditor Switches ..... 105
TABLE 12 Cross-sectional Test – Partitioning the samples into two subsamples 
for Top Ten and Non-Top Ten Audit Firms ........................................................ 108 
TABLE 13 Additional Test – Using Sample without Missing Values ............... 113
?
?
?
?
iv?
?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my Chief 
Supervisor, Professor LIN Zhenpin, Kenny, and Co-supervisor, Professor QIANG 
Wei, for their patient guidance, insightful comments, continuous encouragement, 
and wholehearted support throughout the process of this project.  
Besides my supervisors, I am sincerely thankful to other members of the 
Panel of Examiners: Professor Sonia WONG, Professor Byron SONG, and 
Professor Nancy SU, for their invaluable advice and constructive comments.  
Finally, I am especially grateful to my dearest parents and family for their 
infinite love and unfailing support as always. I also appreciate the fellowship with 
my postgraduate studies friends, whose comradeship make the MPhil journey 
shining with courage.  
1?
?
Do Auditors Communicate Financial Misstatement Risk in Audit 
Report? Evidence from Subsequent Accounting Restatements  
in China 
?
Chapter 1  Introduction 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) initiated 
new and revised audit reporting standards and related conforming amendments for 
reporting on audited financial statements on January 15, 2015.1 In particular, the New 
ISA 7012 copes with the responsibility of auditors to convey key audit matters (KAMs) 
of the listed entities in the auditor’s report.3 The U.S. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) suggested the effective date for the inclusion of critical 
audit matters in audited financial statements to be on or after June 30, 2019, for large 
accelerated companies; and December 15, 2020, for all other applicable companies 
(PCAOB 2017). The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) 
imposed the new standard on audit reports for its A-shares and H-shares effective on 
or after January 1, 2017 and for its other applicable shares on or after January 1, 2018 
(CICPA 2016). The actions taken by IAASB, PCAOB, CICPA and the respective 
regulatory bodies in other countries serve as responses to the request from investors 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1The new and revised auditor reporting standards include the New International Standard on Auditing 
(ISA) 701 – “Communicating Key Audit Matters (KAMs) in the Independent Auditor’s Report,” ISA 
700 (Revised) – “Forming an Opinion and Reporting on Financial Statements,” and ISA 570 (Revised) 
– “Going Concern.” 
2The effective date for the New ISA 701 generally applies to the audits of financial statements for the 
periods ending on or after December 15, 2016. However, this date varies among countries such as the 
United Kingdom (June 17, 2016); Canada (December 15, 2018), and so on.      
3According to the New ISA 701, paragraph 8, the definition of KAMs refer to “those matters that, in the 
auditor’s professional judgment, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the 
current period. Key audit matters are selected from matters communicated with those charged with 
governance.” Auditors shall consider “Areas of higher assessed risk of material misstatement, or 
significant risks identified in accordance with ISA 315 (Revised) (Ref: Para. A19–A22).” 
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and other financial statement users for more informative and relevant auditors’ reports. 
Moreover, international professional practitioners such as EY, Deloitte, KPMG, and 
PwC have closely followed and welcomed the new standards in enhanced audit reports. 
They have also attached importance to these standard changes in the new and enhanced 
audit reports by providing positive feedback and updates via their official websites.4
 While standard setters expect the revised audit reports to be more informative and 
valuable, I am doubtful about the informative content of prior audit reports. Were they 
boilerplate to the extent that they predicted? Were they as uninformative as they 
expected? 5In this thesis, I am interested in addressing the above questions in China’s 
financial reporting and auditing standards, which are in compliance with the 
international ones (CSRC 2010).6 Moreover, China’s regulators accept audit reports 
other than unqualified opinions in practice unlike the PCAOB in the United States. 
The variety of audit reports allow for more variations in my empirical tests and 
moreover, China has assumed an important position in emerging markets in recent 
decades. According to the 2017 annual statistics released by The World Federation of 
Exchange (WFE), the total market capitalization of the companies listed on the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4For example, Bob Moritz, PwC’s Global Chairman, prefers the new and enhanced audit reports over 
the traditional ones as they provide higher transparency to the shareholders and other users of the that 
information, shed light on the most significant areas of study audits, explain these significances and 
how audits address them. He believes that the new and enhanced audit reports are of high quality, 
valuable and relevant.     
5E.g. Lennox (1999) finds evidence that the information content of audit reports did not signal useful 
additional information about the bankruptcy probability of firms.?
6According to the CSRC Annual Report 2010, both the convergence of the Chinese auditing standards 
with the international auditing standards (IAASB) and the convergence of the Chinese accounting 
standards with the international accounting standards commenced by the end of 2005 and 2006, 
respectively. ?
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Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges amounted to RMB56.71 trillion (USD8.70 
trillion), which ranks second in the world and first among the Asia-Pacific countries.  
This thesis examines whether and how auditors communicate financial 
misstatement risks in audit reports. Specifically, I conduct textual analysis of audit 
reports which issue MAOs or a more severe type of audit opinions with explanatory 
notes and investigate which type of audit reports could indicate a higher probability of 
incidences of subsequent restatements. I use the incidences of subsequent restatements 
as a proxy for financial misstatement risks in audited financial statements. The 
financial reporting environment in China is different from that in many developed 
western countries where the institutions to protect investors are strong. In China, many 
listed enterprises are state-owned with the top management assigned by the 
government. The unique nature of the ownership structure in Chinese public 
companies implies that controlling shareholders and general managers typically pursue 
the objectives (e.g., local job creations, social welfare of local community) of the local 
and central governments at the expense of minority shareholders. Moreover, many 
public companies often rely on relationship lending (i.e., bank loans) from state owned 
commercial banks to finance their potential projects rather than access to equity 
financing. As a result, these firms’ incentive to provide transparent financial reporting 
is relatively low. On the other hand, CPA firms in China are relatively small in market 
share and consequently, they have incentives to compromise their audit quality to 
please clients. Although corporate managers and auditors are not easy to be sued by 
the public investors for suspicious accounting practices according to Chinese 
Company Law, they are subject to stringent public enforcement actions taken by the 
securities market regulators (e.g., CSRC and CICPA). Auditors, at the same time, 
4?
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maintain their reputation by conducting good quality audits to retain their clients7 and 
ensure that their businesses continue to run. Under these complex situations, I am 
interested in investigating the information content of auditor reports and their 
association with audit quality in China. 
By examining the quality of auditor reports in China, I associate Chinese listed 
companies’ audit opinions with their subsequent accounting restatements. Auditors in 
China can issue six types of audit opinions: standard unqualified opinion, unqualified 
opinion with emphasis of matters, qualified opinions, qualified opinion with emphasis 
of matters, adverse opinion, and disclaimer opinion. Using standard unqualified 
opinion as a baseline, I expect qualified opinions (including qualified opinion with 
emphasis of matters) and adverse opinion indicate higher incidence of misstatements 
in the financial statements because in such cases the financial statements are not fairly 
presented in accordance with accounting standards. I also expect the disclaimer 
opinion is more likely to associate with subsequent restatements because auditors can’t 
obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence to verify the financial statements. 
However, the association between modified unqualified opinion (i.e., unqualified 
opinion with emphasis of matters) and subsequent restatements is far from obvious. 
On the one hand, financial statements with unqualified opinion with emphasis of 
matters by nature are fairly presented in compliance with accounting standards and 
regulations and should be free from any material misstatements. On the other hand, 
auditors might choose to highlight the highly controversial accounting practices in the 
unqualified opinion to avoid issuing a more severe modified opinion to the client. This 
is supported by the evidence that market perceive negative information from the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7Previous literature shows evidence that auditor reputation produces incentives for auditing with high 
quality (Barton 2005; Weber et al. 2008; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; DeFond and Zhang 2014).   
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modified unqualified opinion and clients do switch auditors to get more favorable audit 
opinions. Therefore, I expect unqualified opinion with emphasis of matters also 
indicates higher likelihood of misstatements in the financial statements but the 
likelihood is lower than other severe modified opinions. With these expectations, I 
hypothesize that listed firms with modified audit opinions are more likely to associate 
with subsequent financial restatements and the association is less for modified 
unqualified opinion (unqualified opinion with emphasis of matters). 
 On further examining the information content of auditor reports, I categorize the 
explanatory notes that were attached to the audit opinion into five types in accordance 
with Chinese auditing standards, the Independent Auditing Specific Guidelines 
Chapter 7 on Audit Report and the Chinese Certified Public Accountant Practice 
Guideline V – Audit Report, both issued in 2003. The five types of explanatory notes 
include (1) accounting policy inconsistency, (2) emphasis of important matters, (3) 
audit-related issues, (4) financial distress and (5) violation of accounting principles in 
China (APC). I expect that to some extent each type of explanatory note can predict 
the incidence of subsequent restatements that indicate the information usefulness of 
the notes. I also hypothesize that explanatory notes added to the unqualified opinions 
are less likely to associate with subsequent restatements than those attached to other 
severe modified audit opinions (e.g., qualified, adverse, and disclaimer opinions).   
 I test my hypotheses by analyzing the A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003–2015. I perform textual analysis and 
classifications on the explanatory notes in the auditor reports and restatement 
announcements. Consistent with my expectations, I find that companies with MAOs 
tend to have higher likelihood of subsequent restatements. Furthermore, listed firms 
with more severe types of audit opinions are associated with a higher probability of 
6?
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subsequent restatements. I also find that explanatory notes regarding the emphasis of 
important matters and audit-related issues have a higher likelihood of reporting 
subsequent restatements than other notes. In addition, conditional on MAOs, the 
emphasis of important matters has a stronger association with and a higher predictive 
power for subsequent restatements than other explanatory notes. Collectively, my 
evidences suggest auditors indeed communicate financial misstatements risk in current 
audit reporting model, even in a weak institutional environment. My findings are 
robust with alternative research regression models; consistent with additional tests for 
SOEs and non-SOEs; and robust to subsamples without auditor switches. Besides 
these, my findings in main results are more aligned with non-top ten audit firms in the 
cross-sectional analysis.    
 This thesis contributes to the existing literature on the informativeness of MAOs. 
First, I use the incidence of subsequent restatements as a proxy for financial 
misstatement risks, and subsequently, financial reporting quality. Prior literature has 
discussed the usefulness of MAOs from different perspectives. According to Chen et 
al. (2016), MAOs reflect credit risks of companies; the more severe the audit opinions, 
the higher the credit risks of companies. Some researchers focus on the specific type 
of MAOs – going-concern (GC) opinions, and discover that GC opinions lead to 
negative reactions of the equity investors (Loudder et al. 1992; Menon and Williams 
2010; Chen et al. 2016). Pei and Hamill (2013) find that MAOs have market effects, 
such that disclaimer opinions initiate negative influences on stock prices most 
significantly. Prior studies demonstrate the usefulness of MAOs in different ways, but 
almost none analyze the details of the explanatory notes in the MAOs. To be thorough, 
I have gone a step further from the traditional research by not only taking into account 
the MAOs, but also studying the details and information content of the explanatory 
7?
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notes attached to the MAOs. I believe my thesis is the first in China to investigate the 
relevance and predictability of MAOs and their explanatory notes for financial 
misstatement risks.  
 My thesis extends and complements Czerney et al.’s (2014) study on auditor 
explanatory language. While the scope of Czerney et al.’s (2014) study extended to 
examining auditors’ explanatory language in unqualified audit reports in the United 
States during 2000–2009, my thesis investigates auditors’ explanatory notes in all 
modified audit reports (including both unqualified and qualified audit reports) in China 
during 2003–2015. Moreover, while Czerney et al.’s (2014) study is limited to 
unqualified audit reports, my thesis examines six types of audit opinions and their 
accompanying explanatory notes for financial misstatement risks. I believe my study 
serves as an extension of Czerney et al.’s (2014) by providing more variations and 
comparisons among different types of audit reports. Next, the United States has been 
known as the largest securities market in the world, and yet, it represents a mature and 
well-developed capital market. While China is a good representative of emerging 
markets with weak institutional environment, its total market capitalization on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges amounted to RMB 37.25 trillion (equivalent 
to USD 6.00 trillion), and ranks second highest globally, next only to the U.S.’s Nasdaq 
of USD 6.98 trillion in 2014 (World Federation of Exchanges Annual Statistics Guide 
2015).8 To summarize, examining the differences in financial reporting standards, 
political features, and securities markets in the United States and China makes my 
study unique. 
 Given that the IAASB has published new and revised auditor reporting standards 
and related conforming amendments to report on audited financial statements, my 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8https://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/statistics/annual-statistics
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findings are consistent with and provide evidence to support policy changes in 
developing new and enhanced auditor reports with tailor-made information content. 
Compared to the prior auditor reports under the old standards (which usually proved 
to be boilerplate and uninformative), the revised auditor reports appear to have 
predictive power in communicating financial misstatement risks. For instance, my 
results show that both explanatory notes on the emphasis of important matters (the 
majority emphasizing contingencies and uncertainties) and audit-related issues 
(mainly audit scope limitation) are significantly associated with subsequent 
restatements, and therefore, financial misstatement risks. Standard setters and 
practitioners may take them as references for further extending information disclosures 
from these two approaches.  
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
institutional background. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the research design and data. Chapter 5 presents the 
descriptive statistics and the univariate analysis. Chapter 6 reports the multivariate 
results, and chapter 7 outlines the conclusions and limitations.  
9?
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Chapter 2  Institutional Background 
?
2.1 Audit Reporting Standards in China 
According to the Chinese auditing standards, the Independent Auditing Specific 
Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit Report issued in 2003, the issuance of audit opinions 
follows a set of specific guidelines.  
Rule 17 states that certified public accountants (CPAs) should issue an audit report 
with unqualified opinions when the following situations arise: (1) financial statements 
are prepared in compliance with the enterprise’s accounting standards and related 
accounting regulations promulgated by the Chinese authorities, and are fairly 
presented in all major aspects of the financial, operating, and cash flows status of the 
audited firm; (2) CPAs implement their audit work as planned, in accordance with the 
independent auditing standards, and without restrictions during the audit process, and 
(3) there are no important matters that should be adjusted or disclosed but have not 
been.
Rule 18 states that the audited firm deserves a qualified audit opinion, if one of 
the following situations takes place: (1) the adoption of accounting policies, use of 
accounting estimates, or disclosure of the financial statements do not comply with the 
national accounting standards and related accounting regulations promulgated by 
Chinese authorities. Although the impact is significant, it does not necessarily lead to 
issuing an audit report with an adverse opinion and (2) because of limited audit scope, 
the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence. Although the 
impact is significant, it does not necessarily lead to issuing an audit report with a 
disclaimer opinion. 
Rule 19 states that if the prepared financial statements do not comply with the 
requirements of the accounting standards and related accounting regulations 
10?
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promulgated by Chinese authorities, and fail to provide a fair representation of the 
financial status, operating results, and cash flows of the audited entity as a whole, the 
CPAs should issue an adverse opinion for the audit report.  
Rule 20 states that if the auditor’s scope of audit is restricted and the impact of 
limited audit scope may be very significant and extensive, it could lead to a disclaimer 
opinion. As the CPAs cannot obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence, they 
cannot form an audit opinion on whether the financial statements are fairly presented 
or not. 
In addition to Rule 17 – Rule 20, the China Certified Public Accountants Practice 
Guideline V – Audit Report – states that the unqualified audit report consists of two 
types – standard unqualified opinions and unqualified opinions with an emphasis on 
matter paragraph (EMP) audit report (section 2.11). CPAs can add an explanatory 
paragraph after the opinion segment of the qualified opinion audit report (section 2.24). 
The guidelines in section 2.5 specify that when there is an audit report with an adverse 
opinion or disclaimer opinion, the CPAs should not add any explanatory paragraphs 
after the opinion segment, and they should not separately express views on any specific 
accounting item, so as not to influence the correct understanding of the financial 
statement users. To conclude, six types of audit opinions are classified together: (1) 
standard unqualified opinions, (2) unqualified opinions with an EMP, (3) qualified 
opinions, (4) qualified opinions with an EMP, (5) adverse opinions, and (6) disclaimer 
opinions. Such classifications of audit opinions are consistent with the audit opinion 
data provided by the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
Solution. Moreover, these six audit opinion types lay the groundwork for the 
classifications in the hypothesis tests in Chapter 4.  
11?
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Moreover, the Chinese auditing standards, the Independent Auditing Specific 
Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit Report and the Chinese Certified Public Accountant 
Practice Guideline V – Audit Report, both issued in 2003, also provide guidance for 
giving explanatory notes.  
 Rule 22 of the Independent Auditing Specific Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit 
Report states the following: First, when there are matters or circumstances that may 
lead to significant doubts about the ability of continuing operations of the audited 
company, and do not affect the opinions that have been issued, CPAs should add the 
EMP after the comment section of the audit report. Second, when there are 
uncertainties (other than continuing operations issues) that may result in a significant 
impact on the accounting statements, and do not affect the published opinions, CPAs 
should consider adding an EMP after the comment section of the audit report to 
emphasize the uncertainties. Third, CPAs should indicate that the EMP should only be 
used to remind users of the financial statements but not affect the published opinions. 
Fourth, except for the two situations specified in Rule 22, CPAs should not add any 
explanatory paragraph after the comment section of the audit report to avoid 
misunderstandings arising among financial statement users. 
 Regarding Rule 22, I categorize the explanatory notes from the EMP into two 
types – (1) the financial distress from the first point of Rule 22 and (2) the emphasis 
important matter from the second point of Rule 22.  
 Furthermore, the Chinese Certified Public Accountant Practice Guideline V – 
Audit Report – has also specified five situations for adding the explanatory paragraph 
after the comment segment of the unqualified audit report (section 2.161) and the 
qualified audit report (section 2.24): (1) There are circumstances that may introduce 
significant doubts about the ability to continue operations; (2) there are contingent 
12?
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liabilities that may have significant impact on the financial statements; (3) there are 
changes in accounting policies and accounting estimates that have a significant impact 
on the financial statements; (4) there are major inconsistencies between other 
information disclosed in the audited financial statements and the audited financial 
statements themselves; and (5) there is emphasis on other major issues, usually 
including major related party transactions, events after the reporting period, correction 
of major accounting errors, and so on. 
 From the above guideline and descriptions, I further categorize points (3) and (4) 
above as the note of the accounting policy inconsistency. Furthermore, consistent with 
Rule 22, situations such as point (1) are classified as the note of financial distress; and 
circumstances such as points (2) and (5) are treated as the note of the emphasis of 
important matters. The explanatory note of the auditing-related issues and the violation 
of APC are mainly connected to the reasons for issuing qualified or disclaimer opinions 
with reference to Rule 18 point (2) and Rule 18 point (1), respectively. Table 2, Panel 
B-III and IV show the specific issues in detail under each category of explanatory notes.  
2.2 Financial Reporting Environment in China versus the U.S. Capital 
Market
 In section 2.2.1 to section 2.2.4, I outline the audit opinion types and financial 
reporting environment, respectively. The United States, which has the largest stock 
market size and market capitalization globally, is chosen as the representative of 
developed Western countries. Although China is the core of my thesis study, it is also 
a representative of countries that are considered as emerging market economies.  
2.2.1 Audit Opinion Types for Public Companies in the United States  
According to the Codification of Statements on Auditing Standard (AU) 508, the 
auditor may express an unqualified opinion, an explanatory paragraph added to the 
13?
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auditor’s standard report, a qualified opinion, an adverse opinion or a disclaimer 
opinion on financial statements. An unqualified opinion is expressed when “the 
financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position, 
results of operations, and cash flows of the entity in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).” A qualified opinion is expressed when (1) 
“there is a lack of sufficient appropriate evidential matter or there are restrictions on 
the scope of the audit that have led the auditor to conclude that he or she cannot express 
an unqualified opinion and he or she has chosen not to disclaim an opinion 
(paragraphs .22-.34)”; or (2) “the auditor believes, on the basis of his or her audit, that 
the financial statements contain a departure from GAAP, the effect of which is material, 
and he or she has chosen not to express an adverse opinion (paragraphs .35-.57)”. An 
adverse opinion is expressed when “in the auditor's judgment, the financial statements 
taken as a whole are not presented fairly in conformity with GAAP.” A disclaimer 
opinion is issued when “an auditor may decline to express an opinion whenever he or 
she is unable to form, or has not formed, an opinion as to the fairness of presentation 
of the financial statements in conformity with GAAP.” Overall, the auditing standards 
in China and the United States for providing guidelines to the auditors in expressing 
audit opinions are generally the same. Thus, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) formally accepts types of audit reports other than unqualified 
opinions issued to public listed companies, and the auditors have to state the reasons 
for the departure from the unqualified opinion (Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board Auditing Standard (AS) 3105 – Departures from Unqualified Opinions and 
Other Reporting Circumstances). However, in practice, data regarding opinions other 
than unqualified are rare in the United States. With reference to audit analytics, a note 
states that “companies that have been issued a qualified or disclaimed opinion cannot 
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be identified using the data set. It is very rare that a company would submit disclaimed 
or qualified opinions to regulators and shareholders. In such cases the company will 
file NT (form 12b, Notification of late filing) and or terminate the auditor.” Prior 
literature has also investigated the phenomenon of “opinion shopping” – companies’ 
strategic use of auditor dismissals to avoid unfavorable audit opinion in the U.S. 
market (Lennox 2000; Lennox 2002). In reality, owing to the unavailability of data of 
qualified or disclaimed opinions and companies’ behavior of opinion shopping, 
unqualified opinion is the only applicable type of audit opinion observed in U.S. public 
companies.  
2.2.2 Audit Opinion Types for Public Companies in China 
 The CSRC accepts six types of audit reports in China (Chinese Auditing 
Standards, Chapter 7, Rules 17-20), namely, standard unqualified opinions, 
unqualified opinions with an EMP, qualified opinions, qualified opinions with an EMP, 
adverse opinions, and disclaimer opinions. Not only do the rules and regulations 
provide the grounds to these six types of audit opinions, but practically speaking, 
auditors also issue opinions other than unqualified ones. During 2003–2015, a total of 
1,422 A-share firms received MAOs for their annual financial statements, with an 
average percentage of 6.22% among all A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The number of MAOs was within the range of 81 to 159 
every year. Data regarding different types of audit opinions for public listed firms are 
available on the CSMAR Solutions. Therefore, six types of audit opinions can be 
viewed in both form and substance. 
 The variety of audit opinions available in China allows me to assess the cross-
sectional variations in the associations between different types of MAOs and the 
incidence of subsequent accounting restatements, which cannot be performed in the 
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U.S. with only one type of MAO – the unqualified opinion with EMP. With this major 
difference of audit opinion types, I focus on China for the scope of my thesis study and 
this enables more information to be gleaned from comparisons among the predictive 
power of MAOs. 
2.2.3 Financial Reporting Environment in the United States 
 Following the public scandals in the early 2000s in the United States, including 
the cases pertaining to Enron, Tyco International, and WorldCom, the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives put together a reform act, namely the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
Act, in 2002 to uphold public confidence in financial reporting quality. The SOX Act 
regulates and improves financial disclosures and strengthens corporate governance to 
deter corporations from committing accounting fraud. The SOX Act stimulated the 
functioning of the PCAOB and changed the emphasis for auditors of U.S. public 
companies from self-regulated to subject to external and independent oversight by the 
PCAOB. Thereafter, the U.S. Senate and House have governed more strictly on listed 
companies and auditors on financial reporting activities. According to Section 302, 
title III of the SOX Act, “Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports” requires the 
organization to have signing officers to verify the financial statements and related 
information fairly present the financial situations and the consequences in all material 
aspects; to evaluate the internal controls of the company and report the findings, all 
deficiencies and any fraudulent activities. Based on Section 404, title IV of the SOX 
Act, “Enhanced Financial Disclosures” requires the auditors to assess and report the 
effectiveness of the internal controls. In addition, Section 802 of the SOX Act, 
“Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability,” imposes penalties of fines and/or up 
to 20 years imprisonment for records, documents, or tangible objects alteration, 
destruction, mutilation, concealment, or falsification with the intention to hinder, 
16?
?
obstruct, or cause impact to a legal investigation. Section 802 also imposes penalties 
of fines and/or imprisonment up to 10 years on any accountant who intentionally and 
purposely violates the requirements of maintenance of all audit evidence or review 
papers for a five-year period. To conclude, the financial reporting requirements in the 
United States have been strengthened while the rules and law enforcement have set 
heavy penalizations against fraudulent accounts from 2002 onwards. The SOX Act 
provides a strong institutional financial reporting environment in the United States. 
2.2.4 Financial Reporting Environment in China 
?
2.2.4.1 The financial reporting incentives of Chinese public companies  
 China had long adopted a centrally planned economy wherein economic decisions 
were not made by free market transactions between consumers and business owners 
but decided by the Chinese government, who in turn gave instructions to business 
managers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China implemented economic reforms 
that gave enterprise managers discretion over sources of finance, production, price 
setting, and labor (Chen et al. 2006). Following the open door policy in 1979, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) tried privatization by reorganizing themselves as limited 
liabilities companies with the substantial objective of profits making.9 In addition, 
many of these companies were subsequently listed and raised share capital from both 
domestic and foreign investors. The economic reforms and the open door policy 
assisted enterprises in China to become privatized from the central government, both 
in terms of internal operations and management, and external financial fundraising and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9Prior to the reforms in Chinese enterprises, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played an important role in 
maintaining social stability and providing social welfare over profit-making (Bai et al. 2000; Chen et al. 
2006).  
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ownership. However, this privatization was only “partial” in nature (Bortolotti and 
Faccio 2004; Chen et al. 2006), as the government and state remained the major and 
ultimate shareholders of many SOEs. For example, according to Chen et al. (2006), on 
average, about 60% of the shares in the listed firms were ultimately owned by the state. 
This shareholding was composed of about 50% held directly by the central or local 
governments and their ministries and bureaus, while the remaining half was held by 
legal entities, with the government as the ultimate owner. According to Chan et al. 
(2006), the Chinese government still takes controls of listed companies by appointing 
their general managers and having a major presence in the board of directors and 
supervisory committees. This situation persisted in 2010 and the chairmen and top 
management of many SOEs were actually members of the Communist Party (Channel 
NewsAsia, August 18, 2017). 10  “Partial privatization” of SOEs is a unique 
characteristic of Chinese listed enterprises.  
     The unique ownership structure in Chinese public companies resulted in 
maximizing shareholders’ value not being the sole objective of companies. The 
controlling shareholders (i.e., SOE) and managers may need to consider job creation 
and social welfare of the community by sacrificing minority shareholders’ interests. 
Apart from this, controlling shareholders often expropriate minority shareholders’ 
interests to enjoy private benefits because of the huge wedge between controlling 
ownership and cash flow rights in Chinese public companies (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Therefore, to conceal their unlawful activities, controlling shareholders and 
managers have little incentive to provide transparent financial reporting to minority 
shareholders (public investors). Moreover, SOE firms usually rely on relationship 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10 News reports further state that the largest 100 SOEs in China formally amended their articles of 
association last year to emphasize the importance of “party building” activities, suggesting that the state 
performs certain strong power of controls on the SOEs.  
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lending (i.e., bank loans) from state-owned commercial banks to finance their potential 
projects rather than resort to equity market financing. Therefore, they have relatively 
little incentive to provide high quality financial reporting to reduce the cost of equity 
capital (Allen et al. 2005; Allen et al. 2017).  
2.2.4.2 CPA Industry and audit quality in China 
 The economic reforms and the open door policy in late 1970s not only restructured 
SOEs, but also initiated the demand for independent audit services in China for the 
major purpose of tax collection (Defond et al. 2000; Chan et al. 2006). In the early 
1980s, most audit firms lacked the necessary capital and required sponsorship from 
government agencies while establishing themselves. This practice greatly induced 
government agencies’ influence on auditors’ judgment and audit opinions (Tang 1999; 
Chan et al. 2006). In 1995, the government recognized the importance of developing 
audit professions that were independent, of high quality, and credible. As a result, in 
1998, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the CSRC began to disaffiliate government 
agencies from their sponsoring audit firms (Chan et al. 2006). The MOF and CSRC 
further issued regulations and set hurdles for audit firms to meet to apply or renew 
their licenses to perform audits for listed firms.11 To fulfill the regulations imposed in 
a short period of time, audit firms commonly increase their firm size through mergers 
(Chan et al. 2006). Overall, unlike audit firms in Western countries, audit firms in 
China are relatively small in scale and the market shares of each audit firm are fairly 
small. Under the regulations imposed by MOF and CSRC, auditors, besides providing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
11In 1997, audit firms were required to have more than eight individual qualified CPAs to sign audit 
reports for the listed firms as the requirement to apply for licenses. In June 2000, this number increased 
from eight to twenty individual qualified CPAs. In addition, the audit firms were required to achieve 
annual revenues of over RMB 8 million (Chan et al. 2006). 
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high-quality auditing services, must also focus on factors that increase their market 
share to ensure the renewal of their audit licenses by the central government.  
 In the mid-1990s, China implemented a set of new and stringent auditing 
standards that attempted to improve credibility in capital markets. However, Defond 
et al. (2000) find that larger auditors that issued modified opinions, to a large extent, 
lose their market share of IPO clients upon adopting these standards. They further 
show that IPO firms switch from larger auditors to smaller ones, “flight from audit 
quality,” in exchange for clean audit opinions. These results can be explained by the 
lack of incentives to demand independent auditors in China. In the early 2000s, the 
opinion shopping behavior of listed firms did not stop. According to Chan et al. (2006), 
local auditors, rather than non-local ones, tend to issue favorable audit reports to local 
government-owned firms. They also find that the opinion shopping behavior of local 
government-owned firms can succeed by switching from a non-local auditor to a local 
one. Collectively, the opinion shopping behavior of listed firms is prevalent in China, 
which is consistent with the notion that Chinese public companies have low incentives 
to provide transparent financial reporting. 
2.2.4.3 The regulatory oversight of auditors in China  
 Unlike the U.S. capital markets, the private litigation environment against 
auditors and corporate managers in China is weak. Corporate laws in China do not 
allow for class litigation against auditors and managers for accounting frauds. One of 
the conditions for the successful litigation against companies/auditors is that the 
companies (defendants) must be charged with fraud by Chinese regulators. These 
conditions create considerable barriers for investors to sue companies with suspicious 
accounting practices. Therefore, private litigation cases against companies for 
accounting fraud and auditors for ignorance are rare in China’s capital markets (Sun 
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and Qiang 2011). However, corporate managers and auditors are subject to 
enforcement action and inspection by the CSRC and the CICPA, which have 
intensified in recent years.  
     The CSRC has played a major role in regulating the securities market in China 
since 1998 (Chen et al. 2006). Its objectives include drawing up relevant laws, 
regulations, and policies for the securities markets; implementing vertical 
administrative work for domestic securities institutions; carrying out comprehensive 
supervision of the securities markets; monitoring the behaviors of the listed firms and 
their shareholders for the fulfillment of related obligations; working with the 
corresponding authorities in examining and approving the qualifications of the 
auditing firms; inspecting and penalizing the parties or firms that violate the relevant 
laws and regulations, and so on. Furthermore, according to CSRC’s 2014 annual report, 
it carried out daily supervision and inspection of 31 audit engagements. It finally 
imposed regulatory actions on 8 audit firms and 42 CPAs. Sun and Qiang (2011) show 
that during 2003–2008, a total of 19 CPA firms were penalized by the CSRC owing to 
audit failures in annual financial reporting, and 394 public companies (on average, 65 
companies each year) and their managers were booked for accounting fraud by the 
CSRC. Similarly, Zhang (2018) reports that nearly 835 firm-year observations were 
charged with financial fraud by the CSRC during 2009–2014. Both studies show that 
the CSRC enforcement actions against auditors and corporate managers have 
intensified recently.  
Both the intentions and work performed by the CSRC indicate that it has put in efforts 
to maintain regulations for the securities markets in China. 
    The CICPA, like the PCAOB in the United States, also conducts inspections on 
CPA firms’ audits of public companies to improve audit quality. According to the CPA 
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firm audit performance?inspection rule (CICPA 2009), CICPA conducts inspections of 
CPA firms qualified in audits of public companies at least once every three years and 
even frequently for CPA firms that (1) had been found to have deficiencies in audits 
during the previous inspections and (2) have not remedied those deficiencies yet. The 
CICPA samples included around five CPA firms that were qualified in inspections of 
audits of public companies based on a few risk factors 12 . The scope of CICPA 
inspection includes quality control systems in CPA firms and compliance with Chinese 
auditing standards, CPA professional ethics standards, and audit quality control 
standards. When CICPA inspection staff discover deficiencies in audit quality control 
systems and violations of auditing and CPA professional ethics standards, they will 
require CPA firms to remedy these deficiencies and initiate substantial penalties 
(admonition, notification criticism, public condemnation) for noncompliance with 
auditing standards and professional ethics.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12Ten risk factors. Please translate section 14. 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/Industry_regulation/Industry_regulation/200907/t20090730_16786.html 
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Chapter 3  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
?
3.1 Financial Reporting Quality  
Biddle et al. (2009) defines “financial reporting quality as the precision with 
which financial reporting conveys information about the firm’s operations, in 
particular its expected cash flows, and that inform equity investors.” Jonas and 
Blanchet (2000) state that “…quality financial reporting is full and transparent 
financial information that is not designed to obfuscate or mislead users” (Tasios and 
Bekiaris 2012). Financial reporting quality is a broad field of study and different 
academic scholars have expressed their definitions in different ways. Nevertheless, 
“precise,” “true and fair,” and “not to mislead users” are often key components in 
defining financial reporting quality. 
Prior literature has also indicated the importance of high-quality financial 
reporting in the capital markets (Lambert et al. 2007; Ng 2011; Maffett 2012;). 
Lambert et al. (2007) suggests that with higher information quality, namely having 
more precise signals, market risks and therefore costs of capital would be lowered in 
the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework. Ng (2011) finds that 
information quality and liquidity risks are negative and economically significant. 
Maffett (2012) suggests that the public financial reporting environment, both firm-
level and county-level features, significantly affects the ability of institutional 
investors to have profitable trading advantages.  
Not only have the academic scholars long discussed the importance of financial 
reporting in providing useful information for capital market investors, but so have the 
financial reporting standards setters. According to International Financial Reporting 
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Standards (IFRS),13 “high-quality financial information is the lifeblood of capital 
markets.” The mission of IFRS is to carry transparency, reinforce accountability, and 
contribute efficiency to financial markets globally by improving IFRS. Hence, both 
academic researchers and financial reporting standard setters share the perspective that 
higher-quality financial reporting will benefit capital market investors.  
3.2 Financial Restatements and Audit Quality 
 While striving for high quality financial reporting is an important objective 
to the academia, the standard setters and practitioners, one indicator – accounting 
misstatement/ financial restatement, is usually taken place as the measure. In prior 
studies, financial restatements have long been used as a proxy for audit quality. 
According to DeAngelo (1981b), fewer subsequent restatements is an indicator of 
better audit quality. Audit quality is defined as a joint probability of auditor 
competence (the ability of the auditor to identify the existing problem) and auditor 
independence (whether the auditor would report the detected problem or not). Keeping 
other factors constant, a more (less) competent and more (less) independent auditor is 
more (less) likely to detect and correct a misstatement, hence reducing (accumulating) 
subsequent restatements. Therefore, a higher occurrence of financial restatements can 
be measured as poorer audit quality or vice versa.  Lobo and Zhao (2013), consistent 
with DeAngelo (1981b)’s definition on audit quality, propose an operational definition 
– “with a stronger negative association between audit fees and restatements reflecting 
higher audit quality”.   
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13International Financial Reporting Standards’ (IFRS) mission is also to develop trust, encourage 
growth, and stabilize the financial interests of the general public worldwide in the long-run. For more 
details, please refer to the following official website: http://www.ifrs.org/about-us/who-we-are/ 
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Further in DeFond and Zhang (2014), restatements measure actual audit quality, 
unlike proxies such as stock price reaction and cost of capital which measure perceived 
audit quality. Restatements are relatively more direct and egregious measures of audit 
quality since they represent those problems the auditor failed to identify and correct 
and hidden in the financial statements during the audit process. DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) state that restatements have a major benefit is that “they are usually strong 
evidence of poor audit quality”. And a subset of restatements “identify the presence of 
management fraud, which is an advantage because many users and regulators believe 
that fraud prevention is the auditor’s first priority”. All in all, the accounting 
restatements are direct indicators for audit quality and commonly used measures in 
prior literatures with varity of research settings.   
Kinney Jr. et al. (2004) investigate whether non-audit services would 
deteriorate the auditor’s independence and constitute decreased quality of financial 
reporting. This study involves restatements in the model by assuming restatements of 
previously issued financial statements represent low-quality financial reporting. 
Kinney Jr. et al. (2004) find that the fees for financial information system design and 
implementation services or internal audit services have no statistically significant 
positive association with restatements. Another finding is that tax services fee is 
negatively statistically significant associated with restatements. Therefore, banning or 
restricting tax services (a type of non-audit services) from a client’s audit firm may 
lower the financial reporting quality or increase the cost of professional services to 
firms without respective benefits from improved audit firm independence.  
Archambeault et al. (2008) explore the association between audit committee 
incentive-based compensation and accounting restatements in financial statements. 
This study specifically uses restatements as the measure of the financial reporting 
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failure.  Archambeault et al. (2008) provide evidence that both audit committee short-
term and long-term stock option grants have a positive association with the accounting 
restatements. It is because when the company issue short-term stock options to the 
audit committee as the compensation, the audit committee members may focus on the 
short-term performance and oversight the audit quality. While for the long-term stock 
option grants, with uncertain payoffs, the audit committee members have less 
motivation to monitor and supervise the management, and in turn, increase the 
likelihood of financial reporting failure. This study suggests to offer a compensation 
mix and emphasize on the carefulness on designing and administrating the audit 
committee member compensation programs.  
Chin and Chi (2009) concentrate on examining the association between the Big 
Four auditors’ industry expertise (by firm-level expertise; by partner-level expertise; 
and by both) and the accounting restatements. Chin and Chi (2009) find that the 
probability of restatements is negatively associated with the existence of industry audit 
experts, where the effects at the partner level are stronger than that at the firm level. 
Audit firms have economic incentives to develop and market their industry expertise 
at partner level, advance from industry expertise at the firm level and office level. Chin 
and Chi (2009) also believe that the incentive for financial statement users to invest in 
companies audited by lead industry experts may be greater than other companies, 
because the earlier companies are less likely to have restatements.  
3.3 Informativeness of Audit Reports 
 The auditor report is definitely a crucial element in the financial reporting 
framework. It represents the output and deliverable of the independent auditor after 
performing audit services for listed firms, to the shareholders, investors, and the 
interested public. Prior studies have long discussed whether auditor reports provide 
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relevant information to stakeholders (Francis 2004; Church et al. 2008; DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). Some scholars are still doubtful about whether auditing non-financial 
information enhances value (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
 Lennox (1999) examined the accuracy and information content of audit reports 
by investigating their predictability on bankruptcy. He found that the audit reports did 
not signal useful incremental information about the probability of bankruptcy. Lennox 
(1999) justified two reasons for the failure of audit reports. First, audit reports did not 
reveal publicly available information about financial distress, including the variations 
on the probability of bankruptcy across industry sectors and during different economic 
conditions (economic recession or recovery). Second, auditors had incentives to repeat 
the same audit opinions. This strong persistence in reporting resulted in audit reports 
unsuccessful to identify failing companies.  
 However, some studies provide evidence that audit opinions do in fact influence 
financial statement users: the more severe the audit opinion is, the higher is the credit 
risk for lenders (Chen et al. 2006); the issuance of a GC opinion would lead to a 
negative reaction from equity investors (Loudder et al. 1992; Menon and Williams 
2010; Chen et al. 2016). Current research on China auditor reports focuses on market 
reactions to MAO (Pei and Hamill 2013) and the effects of MAOs on financial 
constraints (Lin et al. 2011).  
Menon and Williams (2010) show that investors will have negative market 
reactions for the first time toward firms with GC audit reports. This paper further 
investigates why investors react so to GC audit reports by analyzing the reasons for 
auditors to give out GC audit reports. The cited reasons by auditors are categorized 
into four types, namely, poor financial performance, financial problems, operating 
problems, and others. It was found that when auditors provide GC audit reports and 
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disclose that a firm is facing financing problems, market reactions are more severe. 
This paper also shows that more negative market reactions would take place when the 
major firm’s ownership is composited by institutional investors.  
Weber and Willenborg (2003) investigate the informativeness of the audit report 
enclosed in the prospectus associated with a firm’s initial public offering. This study 
finds evidence that larger auditors better transmit and estimate the investment viability 
of their small-market capitalization IPO clients. Weber and Willenborg (2003) also 
find that larger auditors provide more informative opinions, which means that their 
pre-IPO opinions are more properly associated with pre-IPO distress and more 
predictive of post-IPO stock performance. 
Fang et al. (2017) focus on investigating audit opinions relating to related party 
transactions. They find that audit opinions that particularly discuss related party 
transactions related to sales or related loans are more likely to have MAOs. This study 
also discovers that related party transactions’ MAOs have higher predictive power for 
future related party transactions – related restatements than MAOs that do not discuss 
related party transactions.  
To summarize, scholars show that valuable information has been delivered to 
financial statement users from different perspectives. Nevertheless, few studies have 
conducted textual analysis of audit reports and explanatory notes in the financial 
setting in China.  
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I formulate my research hypotheses in exploring the overall audit 
quality in China and examining the information content of the explanatory notes inside 
the audit opinions. Based on the Chinese auditing standards, the Independent Auditing 
Specific Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit Report and the Chinese Certified Public 
28?
?
Accountant Practice Guideline V – Audit Report, both issued in 2003, I provide the 
grounds to classify and form six types of audit opinions (including standard 
unqualified opinions, unqualified opinions with EMP, qualified opinions, qualified 
opinions with EMP, adverse opinions, and disclaimer opinions) and five types of 
explanatory notes (including accounting policy inconsistency; emphasizing important 
matters; auditing-related issues; financial distress, and violation of APC) for the 
dependent variables. I expect that listed firms with MAOs will be more likely to have 
subsequent accounting restatements. I also expect that listed firms with more serious 
audit opinion types are more likely to have subsequent accounting restatements. 
Furthermore, I expect the explanatory notes in the audit opinions are comprehensive 
enough to communicate financial misstatement risks, but in different degrees of 
influence. The research hypotheses are discussed below. 
3.3.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) and Restatements in China 
Based on the Chinese Auditing Standard, the Independent Auditing Specific 
Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit Report (2003) provides the basic grounds for 
classifying audit opinions into six types: (1) standard unqualified opinions, (2) 
unqualified opinions with an EMP, (3) qualified opinions, (4) qualified opinions with 
an EMP, (5) adverse opinions, and (6) disclaimer opinions. Among these six types of 
audit opinions, only (1) standard unqualified opinion is an unmodified audit opinion 
that does not involve modifying any part of the audit opinions and standardizing the 
format of the audit report. The other five types (2) – (6) of audit opinions are all MAO. 
The auditor either adds an EMP to the audit report to arouse the financial statement 
users’ attention on matters they would like to highlight, or states the reasons for giving 
a qualified opinion in the audit opinion paragraph, or both. Among the five types of 
MAO, only one audit opinion type is unqualified, but modified, i.e., the unqualified 
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audit opinion with an EMP. Figure 1 portrays the classification of the six types of audit 
opinions.
[FIGURE 1] 
Based on the Chinese Auditing Standard, if financial statements are not free from 
material misstatements, the auditor should consider issuing a qualified, qualified with 
EMP, disclaimer, or adverse opinion. Supported by this definition, I expect that 
normally a qualified, qualified with EMP, disclaimer, and adverse opinion would 
contain accounting misstatements. When the unqualified opinion with EMP is an 
unqualified opinion and its emphasis matter should only be used to remind financial 
statement users but not affect the published opinions (Rule 22, Chapter 7 of the 
Chinese Auditing Standard 2003), the unqualified opinion with EMP should not 
involve material accounting misstatements in the financial statements on the grounds 
of the auditing standards. However, prior literature does provide evidence that the 
unqualified audit opinion with EMP has a negative market reaction (Song and Yun 
2005, Pei and Hamill 2013) and has more significant negative information than clean 
audit opinions (Pei and Hamill 2013).  
Given that the listed firms would prefer to have a clean audit opinion instead of a 
qualified audit opinion due to the higher cost of receiving a qualified audit opinion, 
including the cost of borrowing, the cost of stock prices drops. While the auditor, on 
the one hand, may please the client and issue an unqualified audit opinion, he or she 
may, on the other hand, consider protecting his or her reputation. To strike a balance 
between the two, the auditor may choose to issue the unqualified opinion with EMP, 
where the existence of EMP may no longer only highlight specific matters to the 
financial statement users, but with financial misstatement implications. In keeping 
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with the above arguments, I expect that listed firms with MAOs (including unqualified 
audit opinion with EMP) are more likely to have a higher financial misstatement risk 
and thus, a higher probability to incur subsequent accounting restatements. Hence, my 
first hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): All other factors being constant, modified audit reports are 
more associated with subsequent accounting restatements than standard unqualified 
audit reports.  
Although audit opinion shopping behavior exists in China (Defond et al. 2000; 
Chan et al. 2006), auditors do face the regulations enforced by the CSRC. I expect that 
unqualified reports with EMP will have higher incidence of subsequent accounting 
restatements than the standard clean audit opinion; while qualified reports (including 
qualified, qualified with EMP, disclaimer, and adverse opinion) will have a higher 
likelihood of incurring subsequent accounting restatements than the unqualified with 
EMP. I anticipate that the more severe the audit opinion type, the higher the probability 
of subsequent accounting restatements. To examine this expectation, I further separate 
the MAOs into their original forms of audit opinion type and observe the associations 
between the audit opinion types and the subsequent accounting restatements. 
Therefore, part two of my first hypothesis is stated below:  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): All other factors being constant, the unqualified opinion 
with EMP is less likely to associate with subsequent accounting restatements than 
qualified opinion/ qualified opinion with EMP/ disclaimer opinion/ adverse opinion 
reports.
3.3.2 Explanatory Notes and Financial Misstatement Risks 
  To further investigate the information content of explanatory notes in audit 
opinions, especially with regard to indicating financial misstatement risks, I categorize 
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the explanatory notes in accordance with the Chinese auditing standards. First, the 
accounting policy inconsistency represents notes that discuss the change in accounting 
policies and accounting estimates that have substantial influence on financial 
statements. As a result of the failure to adopt a new accounting policy or misinterpret 
the change in accounting policy, accounting policy inconsistency will end up with 
incomparable accounting numbers of the same account in financial statements over 
two consecutive years. Such inconsistencies can lead to accounting errors and mistakes 
that require retrospective adjustments, and thus, accounting restatements may occur to 
correct these false accounting transactions. Therefore, I expect the explanatory notes 
about accounting policy inconsistency to have a positive association with the 
subsequent accounting restatements.  
Second, with regard to emphasizing important matters, such explanatory notes 
include issues emphasizing company mergers and acquisitions, related party 
transactions, litigation and regulatory activities, contingency and uncertainties, and so 
on. As the emphasized incidents on the notes are usually related to accounting items 
with complicated accounting treatments and multifaceted accounting standards, 
accounting errors and misstatements are made and hidden in between. Thus, I expect 
that the explanatory notes about emphasizing important matters have higher 
misstatement risks and are positively associated with the subsequent accounting 
restatements. In addition, the prior literature provides evidence that the MAOs with 
related party transactions have higher associations with related party transactions’ 
related restatements (Fang et al. 2017). 
Third, with regard to the auditing-related issues, these types of explanatory notes 
are mainly about audit scope limitations wherein auditors may face difficulties in 
obtaining sufficient and appropriate audit evidence in their auditing process (Rule 18 
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point (2)). When auditors fail to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence, 
doubts are raised as to whether their respective areas are free from material 
misstatements. Thus, I expect that the notes regarding auditing-related issues are 
positively related to the subsequent accounting restatements.  
Fourth, with regard to financial distress, this includes the explanatory notes stating 
that the auditor suspects the sustainable operations and/or financial stability of the 
listed firms; alternatively, the auditor finds evidence that the listed firms involve debt 
restructuring or bankruptcy (Rule 22 point (1)). In the prior literature, listed firms that 
issued MAOs, and especially GC opinions, are associated with less favorable loan 
terms, e.g., higher interest spreads, wherein the audit opinions together with their 
explanatory notes serve as information guidelines for private lenders for debt 
contracting (Chen et al. 2016). From the perspective of these information guidelines 
for indicating financial misstatement risks, the poor or good financial conditions of 
firms tend to have no relation with high- or low-quality financial reporting. Therefore, 
I expect that the explanatory notes about financial distress are not related to subsequent 
accounting restatements.  
Fifth, regarding the violation of APC, this explanatory note is about the 
accounting treatments of listed firms that are inconsistent with the APC and with the 
related accounting regulations promulgated in China (Rule 18 point (1)). When the 
auditor mentions the violation parts in the notes, the related sections involve 
accounting errors and mistakes – to correct those errors to achieve consistency with 
the APC, accounting restatements are generated. Thus, I expect that the notes about 
violation of the APC are positively associated with the subsequent accounting 
restatements.  
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All in all, among the five types of explanatory notes, I expect that notes about 
accounting policy inconsistency and violation of the APC have the strongest predictive 
power for subsequent accounting restatements. The notes about emphasis on important 
matters and auditing-related issues have moderate positive associations with the 
subsequent accounting restatements. Furthermore, the notes about financial distress 
have no association with the financial misstatement risks. I would like to examine the 
above expectations on the types of notes by presenting my second hypothesis as 
follows:  
 Hypothesis 2a (H2a): All other factors being constant, the contents of 
explanatory notes in modified audit reports are heterogeneously predictive of the 
subsequent accounting restatements.  
 Furthermore, I infer from the expectations in H1b that the unqualified opinion 
with EMP has a lower predictive power than qualified opinions (including qualified 
opinion, qualified opinion with EMP, adverse opinion, and disclaimer opinion). I 
expect that the same types of explanatory notes in qualified opinions have a higher 
predictive power of subsequent accounting restatements than those in unqualified 
opinions. Hence, part two of my second hypothesis is as follows: 
 Hypothesis 2b (H2b): All other factors being constant, the contents of 
explanatory notes in qualified audit reports have higher predictive power of the 
subsequent accounting restatements than those in unqualified audit reports. 
?
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Chapter 4  Research Design and Data 
4. 1 Research Design 
?
4.1.1 Test of Hypothesis 1 
Recalling H1 in that MAOs are more indicative of subsequent accounting 
restatements than unqualified opinion, I use the logistic regression model (1) with both 
industry and year fixed effects14 to examine this hypothesis. The dependent variable, 
?????????????, equals one if the financial statements in current year? ? have been 
restated subsequently, and zero otherwise. To test H1, I formulate the tests into a two-
step approach. First, I define MAOs as all types of opinions except standard unqualified 
audit opinions (STANDARD_UNQUALIFIED). It follows that MAOs include 
unqualified opinions with an EMP (UNQUALIFIED_EMP), qualified opinions 
(QUALIFIED), qualified opinions with an EMP (QUALIFIED_EMP), adverse 
opinions (ADVERSE), and disclaimer opinion (DISCLAIMER). Therefore, I categorize 
audit reports into two types only, namely, unmodified audit opinion (i.e.,
STANDARD_UNQUALIFIED) and modified audit opinion and form only one 
independent variable indicator, MAOs, where MAOs equals to one when one of the 
modified audit opinions is issued to a firm, and zero otherwise. The base sample is the 
firm-years with standard unqualified audit reports where MAOs equals zero. Further, 
MAOs equals one if it falls into any of the mentioned opinions other than 
STANDARD_UNQUALIFIED. I expect that the coefficient of my independent variable 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14I also use ordinary least square regression (OLS) with industry and year fixed effects to estimate the 
coefficients on MAO, which directly indicate the incremental likelihood of misstatements discovered 
subsequently for companies receiving MAOs. In addition, in the robustness tests, I include firm fixed 
effects and firm random effects in the logistic regression models and OLS regression models to control 
for the unobservable stable and unstable firm characteristics that may correlate with both MAOs and 
accounting restatements.  
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of interest is significantly positive, ?? ? ? ? , because I hypothesize that compared 
with firms having STANDARD_UNQUALIFIED, firms with MAOs are more likely to 
discover accounting misstatements in the current financial statements than in the 
subsequent periods. The logistic regression model (1) for the first-step test of H1 is as 
follows: 
????????????? ? ? ?? ? ??? ? ? ????? ? ? ?????????? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????? ? ??????? ? ????   (1) 
In the second-step of testing H1, I examine which type of MAO communicates a 
higher incidence of subsequent restatements. In doing so, I separate MAOs into five 
types according to their original forms of audit opinions. Again, the baseline sample is 
the firm-years with standard unqualified auditor reports. Thus, four independent 
variables of interest are generated in total, including UNQUALIFIED_EMP, 
QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER. 15  The variable 
????????????????? ? ?  if firm-years are issued with an unqualified auditor 
report with EMPs, and zero otherwise. The variable ??????????? ? ?if firm-years 
are issued with the qualified auditor reports, and zero otherwise. The variable 
??????????????? ? ? if firm-years are issued with qualified auditor reports with 
EMPs. The variable ???????????? ? ? if firm-years are issued with the disclaimer 
auditor reports, and zero otherwise. As I expect that compared to the standard 
unqualified auditor reports, the other four types of audit reports – 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP; QUALIFIED; QUALIFIED_EMP; and DISCLAIMER – have 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15 As no audit report for financial years 2003–2015 contains adverse opinions, the total categorized 
modified audit opinions are reduced from five types to four types only. The zero observation of adverse 
opinion may be due to improved competence of listed firms in preparing their financial statements or 
the consequences of opinion shopping behavior in China.?
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a higher probability of incurring subsequent accounting restatements of the current-
year financial statements, the respective coefficients of ??? ?, ??? ?, ??? ?? and ?? ?
are expected to be greater than zero. I also hypothesize that qualified and disclaimer 
opinions convey higher incidences of accounting restatements of current financial 
statements than unqualified opinion with emphasis of matters. Thus, I test the relative 
magnitude of coefficients from ?? ? versus ?? ? - ?? ? to investigate which type of 
auditor’s report has the strongest power to predict subsequent restatements. I expect 
?? ? to be significantly less than ?? ?-? ?? ?. The corresponding logistic regression 
model (2) for the second-step test of H1 is as follows: 
????????????? ? ? ?? ? ??? ? ? ???????????????? ? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????? ? ? ??? ? ?? ?????????????? ? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ? ?? ?????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?????? ? ????                             (2)  
I include control variables that affect the likelihood of accounting misstatements 
in both (1) and (2), which are discussed in detail in section 4.3. In addition to the 
logistic regression model, I also use the ordinary least square (OLS) model for 
additional support to observe how the probability of having restatements changes when 
the MAOs increase from zero to one.  
4.1.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 
    To examine H2 where the contents of explanatory notes are heterogeneously 
predictive of the subsequent accounting restatements, I categorize the explanatory 
notes into five types of issues based on Chinese audit reporting 
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standards: 1617 accounting policy inconsistency (ACC_POL_INCON) emphasizing 
important matters (EM_IMPO_MAT), audit-related issues (AUDIT_REL_ISS),
financial distress issues (FIN_DIS), and violations of accounting principles in China 
(VIO_APC). Panel B-III and IV, Table 2 shows the detailed issues under each category.  
In model (3), the variable ACC_POL_INCON equals one if explanatory notes 
discuss accounting policy inconsistency issues, and zero otherwise. The variable 
EM_IMPO_MAT equals one if the explanatory notes emphasize important matters 
such as related party transactions and contingencies and uncertainties, and zero 
otherwise. The variable AUDIT_REL_ISS equals one if explanatory notes discuss 
auditing-related issues such as the use of other auditors’ work and audit scope 
limitation, and zero otherwise. The variable FIN_DIS equals one if explanatory notes 
discuss financial distress factors, and zero otherwise. The variable VIO_APC equals 
one if explanatory notes identify violations of the China accounting standards, and 
zero otherwise. In keeping with Hypothesis 2, I expect MAOs involving explanatory 
notes on ACC_POL_INCON, or EM_IMPO_MAT, or AUDIT_REL_ISS, or VIO_APC 
to have a higher probability of incurring subsequent accounting restatements than audit 
reports without such explanatory notes. As the inconsistency of accounting policy may 
lead to problematic accounting items on the current financial statements, emphasizing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16Explanatory notes are not limited to an EMP. They are present in all kinds of MAOs, but are not 
restricted to those opinions with an EMP alone. For instance, for the auditor reports of firms with 
qualified opinions, the auditor has to add an explanatory paragraph before the opinion paragraph to 
explain plainly the reasons why qualified opinions are issued. Such an explanatory paragraph is treated 
as part of the explanatory notes and included in my analysis.   
17According to Rule 21 of the Independent Auditing Specific Guidelines Chapter 7 on Audit Report 
issued in 2003 in the Chinese Auditing Standard, in an auditor report with qualified, adverse, or 
disclaimer opinions, the auditor should add an explanatory paragraph before the opinion paragraph to 
clearly explain all the reasons that led to the opinion expressed. If possible, the auditor should indicate 
the extent of the impact on financial statements.  ?
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matters about related parties, contingencies, and so on, may cause the respective 
accounts or liability balances to change, and the audit-related issues and violation of 
the APC may induce the current accounting items to be misstated and finally lead to 
subsequent accounting restatements. Therefore, the coefficients of ?? ? ,??? ?, ??? ?,
and ?? ? are expected to be greater than zero. Explanatory notes related to financial 
distress describe overall financial situations of the firms, and therefore, I do not form 
any expectation of positive or negative sign on its coefficients towards the subsequent 
accounting restatements, and ?? ? may be less than or greater than zero. Similarly, I 
also compare the relative magnitude of the coefficients from ?? ?  to ?? ?  to 
investigate which type of explanatory notes has the greatest power to predict 
subsequent restatements. The corresponding logistic regression model (3) to test H2 is
as follows: 
????????????? ? ?? ? ??? ? ? ????????????? ? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ??? ? ? ??????????????? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ????????? ? ????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?????????? ? ?? ?????? ? ????         
                  (3) 
Hypothesis 2b suggests that the materiality of the explanatory notes should be 
conditional on the types of audit opinions. I expect that the explanatory notes included 
in the qualified, adverse and disclaimer opinions should be more likely to indicate 
subsequent restatements than the notes included in unqualified opinions with emphasis 
of matters. To test H2b, I augment model (3) by including the interactions between 
???? and categories of explanatory notes in? ????. In model (4), the categories of 
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explanatory notes remain the same as those in model (3), including accounting policy 
inconsistency (ACC_POL_INCON), emphasis of important matters 
(EM_IMPO_MAT), auditing-related issues (AUDIT_REL_ISS), financial distress 
(FIN_DIS), and violations of accounting principles (VIO_APC). Audit opinions have 
been categorized into three groups: standard unqualified opinions 
(STANDARD_UNQUALIFIED), unqualified opinions with emphasis of matters 
(UNQUALIFIED_EMP), and other modified opinions (OTHER_MAOs) including
qualified, qualified with EMPs, adverse, and disclaimer opinions. I test the 
heterogeneous prediction power of auditors’ explanatory notes conditional on the three 
types of auditors’ reports. The coefficients of interest are ??? ? , ??? ?? and ??? to 
?????  Similarly, I also include the control variables that affect the likelihood of 
accounting misstatements in models (3) and (4), which are the same as those in model 
(1) and (2). Definitions of variables used in model (3) and (4) are shown in the 
Appendix. The regression model (4) is as follows: 
????????????? ? ? ?? ? ??? ? ? ????????????????? ? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ????????????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ????????????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ????????????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ????????????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ??? ?? ? ????????????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ???????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ???????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ???????????? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????????????? ? ? ??? ? ? ???????????? ?
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ??? ?? ? ???????????? ? ?????????? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????? ? ?? ?????????? ? ? ?? ?????? ? ???                   
                                          (4) 
Further to the logistic regression model, I also include the OLS model for 
additional support to detect how the probability of having restatement changed when 
the explanatory notes and interactions between ???? and categories of explanatory 
notes in ???? increase from zero to one. 
4.2 Data Collection 
?
4.2.1 Data Sources 
Both dependent variable, RESTATEMENT, and independent variable, 
EXPLANATORY NOTE, in the audit report are not available from the existing 
databases. Thus, I (1) physically collect the accounting restatements information 
disclosed in the corporate announcements18 and (2) conduct the classifications and 
process the details of the explanatory notes extracted from annual audit reports.  
 For RESTATEMENT, I first generate a summary table of listed firms that are 
involved in restatements from the WIND database, including stock code, restatement 
announcement date, and the link to access the original restatement announcement 
documents. Next, I read the restatements announcements and obtain the period of 
misstatement in financial statements, the magnitude of misstatements, and the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18 According to point 20, Rule 30, Chapter 4 of The Listed Company Information Disclosure 
Requirement issued by the CSRC, the listed firm needs to make a public announcement immediately of 
any major events that may affect its market price of shares. The scope of major event includes 
misstatements that may have occurred in the previous disclosed financial statements. The listed firm 
needs to notify the investor about the cause, current status, impact, and corrections of these major events.  
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misstated accounts and transactions. The variable of interest, RESTATEMENT,
therefore, can be attained correspondingly by examining the misstatement period. The 
restatement information can also be cross-checked with the announcements that are 
publicly available on the CNINFO website. 
 For EXPLANATORY NOTE, I collect audit reports with MAOs from the CSMAR 
Solution. Subsequently, I read the explanatory note of modified audit reports and 
manually classify the notes into five types according to the Chinese audit reporting 
standards. Thus, the EXPLANATORY NOTE of the sample firms can be obtained and 
documented accordingly. I obtain all control financial control variables and stock 
prices from the CSMAR database.  
4.2.2 Sample Selection  
I focus my study on A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from 2003 to 2015. I choose my sample period to begin in 2003 because 
the new audit reporting standards structure with six types of audit opinions are used 
thereafter and material restatements are required to be disclosed in coprorate events 
announcements commencing 2003.19 20 I end the sample period in 2015 because 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 Prior to 2003, there were seven types of audit opinions: standard unqualified opinions; qualified 
opinions, adverse opinions, disclaimer opinions, unqualified opinions with explanation notes, qualified 
opinions with explanation notes, and adverse opinions with explanatory notes. From 2003 onwards, six 
types of audit opinions are available: standard unqualified opinions, qualified opinions, adverse 
opinions, disclaimer opinions, unqualified opinions with emphasis of matter paragraph, and qualified 
opinions with emphasis of matter paragraph. 
20On the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, two types of shares, A-shares and B-shares, are 
traded. A-shares are denominated in Chinese Yuan and are mainly traded by domestic investors, while 
B-shares are denominated in USD in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and HKD in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, mainly opened to foreign investors. In October 2009, ChiNext market was inaugurated on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which served as a critical platform for those growth enterprises that were 
listed and drove innovation. As the three types of shares have different backgrounds, features, and 
42?
?
sample firms should have data for at least two years after the audit report date to allow 
appropriate time for the firm or its auditor to identify problems that could constitute a 
restatement. To fulfill the same requirement, I also exclude 139 firm-year observations 
missing CSMAR Solution data in the subsequent two years. Finally, 17 observations 
that have missing data in any control variables are excluded from the analysis. The 
ultimate sample size for the study is 22,850 firm-year observations, with details shown 
in TABLE 1.  
[TABLE 1] 
4.3 Control Variables 
Control variables in six aspects are added to the regression models (1) – (4) (1).
First, I control for variables regarding the firm’s characteristics, including firm size 
(SIZE) and firm age (AGE) in the tests (Czerney et al. 2014; Fang et al. 2017). Larger 
and older firms are equipped with relatively well-established accounting systems to 
avoid financial misstatements.   
Second, I add control variables pertaining to the firm’s economic conditions, 
which are return on assets (ROA), book-to-market ratio (BOOK_MKT), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), a dummy for positive accruals (POSITIVE_ACCR), an indicator for net 
loss for the year (LOSS), and the growth rate of the firm (GROWTH). Prior literature 
has documented that there is a lower probablity of misreports from firms having higher 
profitability, i.e., a higher ROA (Kinney and McDaniel 1989). I also expect that firms 
making profits, but not losses (LOSS) are less likely to issue financial misstatements. 
However, a few sections of the literature find mixed signs and relations between the 
ROA and misstatements (Erickson et al. 2006). According to Kinney and McDaniel 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
requirements, I consider carrying out my study on A-shares in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. 
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(1989) and Defond and Jiambalvo (1991), growth (GROWTH) and restatements are 
negatively associated. I also expect that firms with lower BOOK_MKT are less likely 
to issue financial misstatements,21 as a lower book-to-market ratio can imply that the 
market value is stronger than the book value, indicating that the market believes the 
firm has brilliant development and growth prospects in future. Such firms can generate 
greater profits and finally raise their book values, and are less likely to commit 
accounting fraud. With respect to leverage, it is expected that LEVERAGE and
restatements are positively related (Burns and Kedia 2006; Lennox and Pittman 2010; 
Cao et al. 2012; Czerney et al. 2014; Fang et al. 2017) because highly leveraged firms 
have greater incentives to misstate to avoid technical default (covenants violations) . I 
further include the POSITIVE_ACCR as one of the control variables because the prior 
literature shows that firms manage accruals to increase earnings. POSITIVE_ACCR
equals one if the firm’s reported net profits are greater than the reported net cash flow 
from operating activities (Czerney et al. 2014).  
Third, I also control for factors related to financing activities, whether the firm 
has issued new shares during the year (ISSUE_SHARE), and whether the firm is 
involved in a merger or acquisition (MERGE_ACQ). Following prior studies (Fang et 
al. 2017), I ISSUE_SHARE equals one if the firm has issued new shares in the financial 
year, and zero otherwise. MERGE_ACQ equals one if the firm has been involved in 
any merger and acquisition activity, and zero otherwise.  
Fourth, I control for factors relevant to audit characteristics, i.e., whether the firm 
is audited by one of the international Big Four accounting firms (BIG_FOUR) and the 
total audit fee of the firm (AUDIT_FEE). Following the prior literature, BIG_FOUR
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21Book-to-market ratio/market-to-book ratio is a common proxy in measuring growth (Cao et al. 2012, 
page 962).  
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and financial misstatements are negatively related because the Big Four auditors have 
good-quality insurance programs (Fang et al. 2017). AUDIT_FEE also has a negative 
association with financial misstatements because greater audit efforts should help 
detect earnings misstatements (Cao et al. 2012). 
Fifth, I control for the firm’s corporate governance factors, including the number 
of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the firm’s board 
(INDEP_DIR) and whether the board’s chairman and the general manager are the same 
person (BOARD_CHAIR). Consistent with prior studies, I expect that firms with more 
independent boards and better corporate governance have less financial misstatements 
(Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Cao et al. 2012; Fang et al. 2017).  
Sixth, I control for the characteristics of shareholders, which include whether the 
firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is a government entity, i.e., a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), and the percentage of ownership held by the controlling shareholder 
of the firm (OWNER). With reference to Wang and Wu (2011), SOE has a positive 
correlation with financial misstatements. I further expect that the percentage of 
ownership held by the controlling shareholders and financial misstatements have a 
negative association (Fang et al. 2017), as the higher the shareholding percentage of 
the controlling shareholders, the narrower the wedge between controlling ownership 
and cash flow rights, and thus, the lower the incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders and misstate earnings.            
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Chapter 5  Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
?
5.1 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) by Year 
Table 2 – Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of four types of modified audit 
opinions (MAOs) in China, year wise, from 2003 to 2015. In general, the highest 
percentage of MAOs among the sample years falls under 2005, which accounts for 
11.93% (159 out of 1,333 opinions). The number of MAOs over all types of opinions 
has an increasing trend from 6.56% (81 out of 1,235 opinions) in 2003 to 11.93% in 
2005. However, a turning point was reached in 2006. Since then, the percentage of 
MAOs has been decreasing gradually every year, from 9.86% in 2006 to 3.92% in 
2015. This declining trend in MAOs reflects the impact of the introduction of new 
Chinese accounting standards and the public companies internal control guidance 
rendered in 2006. These new accounting standards converge with the IFRS and may, 
on average, improve the earnings quality of public companies. Similar to Sections 302 
and 404 of the SOX Act, the internal control guidance introduced by the stock 
exchanges require that managers and auditors assess public companies’ internal 
controls and identify and report significant weaknesses, in a report to investors. Clearly, 
the internal control assessment enhances companies’ internal control over financial 
reporting and improves earnings quality. 
The average percentage of MAOs in the sample years is 6.22% (1,422 out of 
22,850 opinions). Regarding each type of MAO, the average percentage of qualified 
opinion (qualified), qualified opinion with emphasis of matter paragraph (qualified 
with EMP) and disclaimer opinion (disclaimer) is 0.97%, 0.38%, and 0.72%, 
respectively. In respect to unqualified opinion with an EMP (unqualified with EMP),
the number of listed firms resulting in such MAOs is within the range from the lowest 
of 50 in 2003 to the highest of 89 in 2007. Regarding a percentage over the total 
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number of listed companies in the respective years, unqualified with EMP scored a 
high of 5.79% (89 out of 1,537 opinions) in 2007 compared to scores in all years in 
the sample period and among all types of MAOs. Unqualified with EMP was retained 
at relatively high percentages of above 5% in the four consecutive years from 2004 to 
2007. The switch took place in 2009 and the percentage showed a decreasing trend 
after that and even scored below 3% during 2013–2014. The number of adverse 
opinions for the sample years is nil.  
[TABLE 2 – Panel A] 
5.2 Modified Audit Opinions (MAOs) by Explanatory Notes 
Panel B-I of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for MAOs of explanatory 
notes, by category. Among a total of 1,422 MAOs from 2003 to 2015, there were 1,986 
explanatory notes. As there may be more than one explanatory note generated for every 
MAO in a particular year, the total number of explanatory notes are more than the total 
number of MAOs. Among the six classified types of explanatory notes, notes related 
to financial distress have the highest frequency of 974 incidences (49.04%), followed 
by notes related to emphasizing important matters with 491 incidences (24.72%), and 
notes related to auditing-related issues with 322 incidences (16.21%). For unqualified
with EMP, over 60% of the explanatory notes are related to financial distress and 
nearly 33.33% of them emphasize important matters. For qualified and disclaimer 
opinions, the two most frequent explanatory notes are related to auditing-related 
matters (33.33%) and financial distress (32.43%).  
[TABLE 2 – Panel B-I] 
Panel B-II of Table 2 reports the explanatory notes among each type of MAO. 
Within qualified opinion, 37.80% of its explanatory notes are about auditing-related 
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issues (127 instances), followed by 22.92% (77 instances) notes related to financial 
distress and 22.02% (74 instances) notes emphasizing important matters. Qualified
with EMP, the most frequent type of explanatory note, falls into the auditing-related 
issues category with 61 instances (28.50%), followed by 58 instances (27.10%) of 
financial distress, and 53 instances of emphasizing important matters (24.77%). For 
the disclaimer opinion, financial distress occurs most frequently among the six types 
of explanatory notes,?with 152 instances (45.37%). Auditing-related issues occur with 
the second highest frequency of 107 instances (31.94%), and emphasizing important 
matters comes third with a frequency of 43 instances (12.84%). Explanatory notes 
related to accounting policy inconsistency, violation of the APC, and other issues occur 
much less frequently than other types of MAOs.  
[TABLE 2 – Panel B-II] 
Panel B-III of Table 2 shows the explanatory notes for MAOs in detail. Financial 
distress is the most frequent type of explanatory note among MAOs, especially for 
unqualified opinions with emphasis of matters. While looking into details of its 
classification, notes that are gravely suspicious of sustainable operations have the 
highest incidence of 536 instances, followed by notes that mention financial 
difficulties and operational uncertainties with 237 instances, and notes that discuss 
firm involvement of debt restructuring or bankruptcy with 201 instances. The second 
most frequent explanatory note is emphasizing important matters in which 
contingencies and uncertainties of 319 instances are the major causes for both 
unqualified opinions with emphasis of matters and qualified and adverse opinions. The 
third highest occurrence of notes is that of auditing-related matters wherein audit scope 
limitation is the most cited reason for the qualified and disclaimer opinions. Finally, 
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171 explanatory notes in MAOs mention violations of accounting standards and rules 
wherein the lack of original documents for accounting transactions is the most cited 
reason.
[TABLE 2 – Panel B-III] 
Panel B-IV Table 2 displays a breakdown of explanatory notes for each type of 
MAO (four types). For unqualified with EMP, the most frequent notes express grave 
suspicions on the sustainability of operations of 398 instances under the financial 
distress category, followed by emphasizing contingencies and uncertainties with 210 
instances under the emphasizing important matters category, followed by notes 
mentioning financial difficulties and operational uncertainties with 153 instances 
under the financial distress category. When it comes to qualified opinion and qualified
with EMP, notes related to audit scope limitation within the audit-related issues 
category occur most frequently for both opinions, with 119 and 55 instances, 
respectively. The second highest occurrence of notes for both opinions is emphasizing 
contingencies and uncertainties under the emphasizing important matters category, 
with 49 instances for qualified and 34 instances for qualified with EMP. The third most 
frequent notes mention grave suspicions about the sustainability of operations in 44 
instances for qualified opinion and mentioning financial difficulties and operational 
uncertainties in 27 instances for qualified with EMP. With respect to disclaimer
opinion, notes about audit scope limitation in 95 instances are the most frequent, 
followed by grave suspicions about the sustainability of operations in 69 instances. 
Further, in the financial distress category, there were 53 instances of cases involving 
debt restructuring or bankruptcy.  
[TABLE 2 – Panel B-IV] 
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5.3 Audit Opinions and Misstatements 
 Panel A of Table 3 demonstrates the univariate analysis of audit opinions and 
accounting misstatements. The number of accounting misstatements that occurred over 
the sample period from 2003 to 2015 was 1,402 instances out of the total audit reports 
of 22,850, which constitutes a 6.14% occurrence of misstatements. Audit opinions are 
categorized into two types only – standard unqualified opinions and MAO (includes 
unqualified opinion with EMP, qualified opinion, qualified opinion with EMP and 
disclaimer opinions). The univariate test shows that 5.35% of listed firms that received 
a standard unqualified opinion on their financial statements had restated their financial 
statements in a subsequent period. In contrast, 17.93% of the listed firms that received 
MAOs had subsequently restated their financial statements. In summary, compared to 
standard unqualified opinions, audit reports issued with MAOs had a 12.58% higher 
possibility of issuing misstatements. A chi-square test is performed and the results are 
significant at 1%.22
[TABLE 3 – Panel A] 
 Panel B of Table 3 illustrates the misstatement frequency by audit opinion type. 
Unlike Panel A, Panel B further categorizes MAOs into four types – unqualified with 
EMP, qualified, qualified with EMP, and disclaimer opinions. Approximately 12.64% 
of the listed firms receiving unqualified with EMP had subsequent restatements of their 
financial statements for the same fiscal year (120 instances out of 949 observations). 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22The null hypothesis asserts the independence of the variables under consideration (i.e., audit opinion 
and subsequent restatement are independent of each other). The chi-square test statistics is 366.414 and 
I reject the null hypothesis at a 1% significance level. In other words, the statement “audit opinion is 
independent from accounting misstatement” is rejected at the 1% significance level.   
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A higher percentage of 27.03% for qualified had subsequent restatements (60 instances 
out of 222 observations). Misstatements occurrence scores an even higher frequency 
of 31.03% (27 instances out of 87 observations) and 29.27% (48 instances out of 164 
observations) when listed firms received qualified with EMP and disclaimer opinions, 
respectively. All in all, the result exhibits an upward tendency of accounting 
restatements when listed firms are issued with a more severe type of audit opinion.  
[TABLE 3 – Panel B] 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 Table 4 presents the general descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, 
RESTATEMENT, independent variable, MAOs, and other control variables. Both 
RESTATEMENT and MAOs are binary variables, and their values equaled one when 
the incidence happened, and zero otherwise. Mean values of approximately 6.1% and 
6.2% for RESTATEMENT and MAOs, respectively, are noted. In the sample size of 
22,850, firms on average have AGE of 10.05, GROWTH ratio of 17.7%, return on 
assets (ROA) of 4.2%, and book-to-market ratio of 1.01. Regarding the audit 
characteristics, the international Big Four accounting firms take up a market share of 
approximately 6.6%. The number of independent directors on average hold 36.1% of 
the total number of director positions on a firm’s board. Around 55% of the listed firms 
are SOE. For the general descriptive statistics of other control variables, please refer 
to Table 4 for details.  
[TABLE 4] 
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Chapter 6  Multivariate Results 
?
6.1 Association between MAOs and Restatements 
Table 5 exhibits coefficients estimates for model (1), which investigates the 
association between MAOs of the current-year audit report and the subsequent 
restatement of the current-year financial statements. My results for the test of H1 in 
the first-step test appear in Columns (1), (2), and (3). Column (1) represents the results 
of the test for H1 by using logistic regression, testing the independent variable of 
interest plainly together with controlling industry and year fixed effects. Column (1) 
serves as the baseline model. Column (2) refers to the results of the test for H1 by 
using logistic regression again but further adds the six types of control variables that 
are specified previously in Chapter 4.3. Column (3) displays the results of the test for 
H1 by using OLS regression to interpret the marginal effects of MAO on the likelihood 
of concurrent accounting misstatements. In Column (1), the coefficient for MAOs is 
positive and statistically significant (with p < 0.01), indicating that financial statements 
associated with modified audit reports are more likely to be subsequently restated than 
those with unmodified audit reports (i.e., standard unqualified opinions). The marginal 
effect on MAOs is calculated.23 Marginally, the financial statements issued with MAOs 
have a 9.347% higher probability of incurring subsequent restatements than those with 
standard unqualified opinions.  
After considering and adding other control variables to the baseline model, in 
Column (2) of Table 5, the coefficient of MAOs is still positive and statistically 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
23In the logistic regression model, the coefficient of explanatory variable (MAOs) provides the direction 
on the change of the probability of response variables (Restatements), with the positive sign indicating 
higher probability and the negative sign indicating lower probability. However, the coefficient does not 
deal with the marginal change on the effect on Restatements. Thus, marginal effects are calculated to 
interpret the magnitude of the change.  
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significant (with p < 0.01), implying that financial statements with MAOs are still 
associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent restatement (with a marginal effect 
of 4.284%) than those with standard unqualified opinions. With respect to the control 
variables, 24  I find the likelihood of accounting restatement increases with 
BOOK_MKT (with p < 0.01), LEVERAGE (with p < 0.1), and decreases with 
GROWTH (with p < 0.1), AUDIT_FEE (with p < 0.05), and OWNER (with p < 0.01). 
In addition, firms making net loss (LOSS), and involving mergers and acquisitions 
activities (MERGE_ACQ), are associated with a greater possibility of subsequent 
restatements at the 1% level. Firms engaged in raising funds through issuance of shares 
(ISSUE_SHARE) and carrying out annual audits by Big Four auditors (BIG_FOUR)
are less likely to report subsequent restatements at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24 Note that non-missing dummy variables have been generated for controls SIZE, BOOK_MKT,
AUDIT_FEE, INDEP_DIR, and OWNER, to capture the missing value effects of the respective controls. 
Specifically,?I generate an indicator/ dummy variable for each of the five controls which have missing 
values. The dummy variable, namely ‘non-missing dummy variable’, equals one for observation 
contains value and equal zero for observation does not have value. By assigning dummy variables for 
controls that contain missing values, and adding interactions between the dummy and the controls, the 
missing value effects of the respective controls are captured without reducing the sample size. This 
method of handling missing values is called dummy variable adjustment (Cohen and Cohen 1983; 
Cohen et al. 2003; Greene 2003) which is commonly used for empirical research studies. According to 
Abrevaya and Donald (2017), approximately 40% of all papers across the four top empirical economics 
journals – American Economic Review, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Labour Economics, 
and Quarterly Journal of Economics, have data missingness, over the three-year period from 2006 to 
2008. And roughly 20% of the papers with missing data use the dummy variable method to handle 
missing data. To retain the sample size, I also adopt this missing variable method for handling the 
missing data. For robustness check, I rerun the main test (1) to (4) by dropping all the observations with 
missing values. The sample size decreases by 5,698, from originally 22,850 to 17,152 observations. The 
result tables also indicate positive and significant associations between the MAOs and explanatory notes 
and the subsequent accounting restatements which are robust to the main tests. Please refer to table 13 
for details.  
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In the Column (3) of Table 5, I use OLS regression to test H1 in the first-step test. 
If the MAOs increase to one unit (i.e., change from standard unqualified opinions to 
modified audit opinions), the likelihood of subsequent restatement increases by 5.2%, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The result in Column (3) is consistent 
with that in Columns (1) and (2). Regarding the control variables, firms with a larger 
SIZE and higher BOOK_MKT tend to have a higher likelihood of subsequent 
restatements, both at the 1% level. Firms that are more mature (greater AGE), have 
better financial performance (larger ROA), faster growth (higher GROWTH), a higher 
controlling percentage of ultimate controlling shareholders (higher OWNER), and are 
less likely to report subsequent restatements, all at the 1% level. Moreover, firms with 
incidences of issuance of shares (ISSUE_SHARE) in the current year, are associated 
with a lower likelihood of subsequent restatements.  
[TABLE 5] 
6.2 Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements 
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates for the second-step test in testing H1. In 
model (2), I further separate the single indicator, MAOs, into four original forms – 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP, QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER. I 
estimate the associations between these four different types of MAOs of the current-
year audit report and the subsequent restatements of the current-year financial 
statements. The results are displayed in Columns (1), (2), and (3).25 In Column (1), 
the four types of MAOs, including UNQUALIFIED_EMP, QUALIFIED,
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25Similar to Table 5, Column (1) of Table 6 is the baseline model that merely includes the independent 
variables and controls the industry and year fixed effects under the logistic regression. Column (2) 
represents the results of the logistic regression that additionally includes the six specified types of 
control variables. Column (3) refers to the results of the test by using OLS regression. 
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QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER, are positively associated with the subsequent 
restatements and are statistically significant at the 1% level. When the audit report 
changes from standard unqualified opinion to UNQUALIFIED_EMP, the probability 
of subsequent restatements marginally increases by 5.78%. Similarly, compared with 
standard unqualified opinions, QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER
opinions marginally increase the probability of subsequent restatements of current 
financial statements by 17.18%, 18.00%, and 17.07%, respectively. The marginal 
effects indicate that a more severe type of audit opinion is associated with a higher 
probability of incurring subsequent restatements.26 Chi-square tests are performed for 
the coefficients among the independent variables. The results show that the coefficient 
of QUALIFIED is significantly larger than the coefficient of UNQUALIFIED_EMP at 
the 1% level, with chi-square test statistics of 15.68. Similarly, the coefficients of both
QUALIFIED_EMP and DISCLAIMER are significantly larger than that of 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP at the 1% level, with chi-square test statistics of 9.51 and 14.06, 
respectively. 
The results in Column (2) of Table 6 are with the same directions as per Column 
(1). By adding other control variables in the logistic regression in model (2), the four 
independent variables of interests are still positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. With respect to the magnitude effects, compared with standard unqualified 
opinions, the likelihood of incurring subsequent restatements are marginally higher for 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP (by 2.29%), QUALIFIED (by 9.95%), QUALIFIED_EMP (by 
9.32%), and DISCLAIMER (by 6.38%). The implications are retained as per the 
baseline model that financial statements with a more severe type of audit opinion are 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 A more severe type of audit opinion refers to qualified opinions, including QUALIFIED,
QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER opinions. Less severe types of audit opinions are the unqualified 
ones, including standard unqualified opinions and UNQUALIFIED_EMP.
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more likely to be subsequently restated than those that have a less severe type of 
opinion. Chi-square tests demonstrate that compared with the coefficient of 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP, the coefficients are significantly larger for QUALIFIED (at 1%, 
with chi-square statistics of 13.94), QUALIFIED_EMP (at 1%, with chi-square 
statistics of 7.31), and DISCLAIMER (at 5%, with chi-square statistics of 4.34). For 
the control variables, both signs and significances are as the same as the logistic 
regression for the first-step test of (1) – Column (2) of Table 5.  
 In Column (3) of Table 6, I re-examine the model (1b) by using the OLS 
regression. Most of the results are consistent with the baseline model in Column (1) 
and full logistic model in Column (2), with the exception of the statistical significance 
for UNQUALIFIED_EMP, which does not hold. I find that when 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP increases to one unit (shifts from standard unqualified opinions 
to unqualified opinions with an EMP), the likelihood of restatements increases by 1.7%. 
When audit reports become QUALIFIED from standard unqualified opinions, the 
likelihood of subsequent restatement increases by 12.5% with p < 0.01. When audit 
reports are modified to QUALIFIED_EMP and DISCLAIMER, the likelihood of 
subsequent restatement increases by 15.5% with p < 0.01 and 14.2% with p <0.01, 
respectively. Chi-square tests are performed between the coefficients of 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP and QUALIFIED; the coefficients of UNQUALIFIED_EMP
and QUALIFIED_EMP; and the coefficients of UNQUALIFIED_EMP and 
DISCLAIMER. The coefficients of QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and 
DISCLAIMER are significantly larger than that of UNQUALIFIED_EMP at the 1% 
level, with chi-square test statistics of 10.97, 7.16, and 9.70, respectively. The results 
indicate that although UNQUALIFIED_EMP is associated with subsequent material 
restatements, this association is weaker than the associations between QUALIFIED or 
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QUALIFIED_EMP or DISCLAIMER and restatements. Thus, auditors, to some extent, 
can make a good judgment call when issuing audit opinions, i.e., incurring less type II 
errors.?Concerning the control variables, except for ROA and ISSUE_SHARE with a 
reduced significance to the 10% and 5% levels, all signs and significance levels are 
consistent with the OLS regression for the first-step test of (1) – Column (3) of Table 
5.
 It is noted that the opinion, UNQUALIFIED_EMP, is supposed to be free from 
material misstatements according to the corresponding auditing standards, and the 
EMP serves in providing additional information that auditors would like to emphasize. 
However, the empirical results do indicate a significant and positive correlation 
between UNQUALIFIED_EMP and incidence of subsequent restatements in both the 
logistic regressions in model (1) under Column (1) and (2). This phenomenon can be 
explained by the opinion shopping behavior in China documented in the prior literature. 
The listed firm is originally issued with a qualified opinion by the auditor; however, it 
is not satisfied and appoints another auditor to repeat the audit work. Moreover, the 
second auditor avails of the opportunity to lessen the consequences by issuing an 
unqualified opinion, but adds the EMP to the audit report as an alternative. Therefore, 
there are cases wherein financial statements originally deserving a qualified opinion 
may get an unqualified one with an EMP in the end, as a result of the opinion shopping 
behavior of the listed firms. 
[TABLE 6] 
6.3 Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements 
 Table 7 presents the results that examine the association between the categorized 
five types of explanatory notes and the subsequent restatements, the first-step test of 
H2 – model (3). In accordance with models (1) and (2), Column (1) is the baseline 
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model; Column (2) refers to the logistic regression with add-ons of other control 
variables; and Column (3) represents the OLS regression. In Column (1) of Table 7, 
the coefficient estimates on the five types of explanatory notes are all positive, but 
each of them carries different marginal effects and statistical significances. When the 
incidence of ACC_POL_INCON takes place, the likelihood of subsequent restatements 
marginally increases by 14.67% with a p value <0.05. The incidence of 
EM_IMPOR_MAT, AUD_RELAT_ISSUE, and FIN_DISTRESS increases the 
probability of incurring subsequent restatements by 6.05% (with p < 0.01), 7.00% 
(with p <0.01), and 3.57% (with p <0.01), respectively. Barring the explanatory note 
– VIO_APC, its coefficient estimate is positive but not significant. The insignificant 
result may be due to firms delisting and exiting the stock market owing to their 
financial statements violating the accounting principles in China. 
 Table 7 – Column (2) displays the results of model (3) by using logistic regression 
with the inclusion of control variables. The coefficient estimates of 
ACC_POL_INCON, EM_IMPOR_MAT, and AUD_RELAT_ISSUE remain positive 
and statistically significant. However, the significances of FIN_DISTRESS and 
VIO_APC do not hold. The incidence of ACC_POL_INCON, EM_IMPOR_MAT, and
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE increases the likelihood of restatement by 12.87% (with p < 
0.05), 4.52% (with p < 0.01), and 3.88% (with p < 0.01), respectively. Regarding the 
control variables, with the exception of LEVERAGE with increased significance to the 
1% level, all signs and significance levels are the same as the logistic regression for 
the first-step test of (1) – Column (2) of Table 5. 
 In Column (3) of Table 7, I estimate the model (3) using OLS regression. The 
results indicate that only the coefficient estimates of EM_IMPOR_MAT and
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels. If 
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EM_IMPOR_MAT increases to one unit, I expect the probability of incidence of 
subsequent restatements to increase by 4.4%. If AUD_RELAT_ISSUE increases to one 
unit, I expect the probability of financial statements being subsequently restated to 
increase by 10.3%. For the control variables, both signs and significances are as the 
same as the OLS regression for the first-step test of (1) – Column (3) of Table 5.   
 To summarize, the predictive power among the five types of explanatory notes is 
different. The incidence of EM_IMPOR_MAT and AUD_RELAT_ISSUE have a 
stronger influence and are more likely to report a subsequent restatement compared 
with the incidence of other explanatory notes, with results consistent among the tests 
in Columns (1), (2), and (3). Thus, the information content with respect to 
EM_IMPOR_MAT and AUD_RELAT_ISSUE are more relevant to subsequent 
restatements.  
[TABLE 7] 
6.4 Association between Explanatory Notes Conditional on MAOs and 
Restatements 
 Table 8 shows the results of examining the association between the five types of 
explanatory notes conditional on MAOs and subsequent restatements, the second-step 
test of H2 – model (4). Similar to the previous tables, Columns (1), (2), and (3) 
represent the baseline model, the logistic regression with add-ons of other control 
variables, and the OLS regression model, respectively. In Column (1), both coefficient 
estimates of UNQUALIFIED_EMP and OTHER_MAOs are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, 27  with marginal effects of 11.40% and 13.52%, 
respectively. Among the ten interactions between explanatory notes and MAO, only 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27OTHER_MAOs refers to the combination of three types of modified audit opinions, including 
qualified opinions, qualified opinions with an EMP, and disclaimer opinions.  
59?
?
two are statistically significant. If the audit report is with OTHER_MAOs and includes 
the explanatory note about EM_IMPOR_MAT, the likelihood of subsequent 
restatements increases by 3.77% (with p < 0.05). If the audit report is with 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP and includes the explanatory note about VIO_APC, the 
likelihood of subsequent restatements decreases by 3.27% (with p < 0.1).   
 Based on Column (2) of Table 8, both UNQUALIFIED_EMP and OTHER_MAOs 
are associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent restatement with marginal effects 
of 7.67% (with p < 0.5) and 8.08% (with p < 0.01), respectively. Regarding the 
interactions, four out of ten interactions report with significances. If the audit report is 
with OTHER_MAOs and includes the explanatory note about EM_IMPOR_MAT, the 
likelihood of subsequent restatements increases by 3.50% (with p < 0.05). The 
incidence of UNQUALIFIED_EMP × FIN_DISTRESS, UNQUALIFIED_EMP × 
VIO_APC, and OTHER_MAOs ×FIN_DISTRESS are less likely to report a subsequent 
restatement at the 5% level, with marginal effects of -2.63%, -3.27%, and -2.14% 
respectively. These results further show that financial distress factors do not 
communicate financial misstatement risk. As most violations of accounting standards 
(VIO_APC) in unqualified opinion with EMP refer to the lack of original documents 
for accounting transactions, they do not necessarily result in misstatements. 
Concerning the control variables, with the exception of LEVERAGE with increased 
significance to the 5% level, all signs and significance levels are the same as the 
logistic regression for the first-step test of (1) – Column (2) of Table 5. 
 In Column (3) of Table 8, I re-examine the H2 in the second-step test by using the 
OLS regression. If UNQUALIFIED_EMP increases to one unit, the subsequent 
restatement increases by 7.5%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. If 
OTHER_MAOs increases to one unit, the subsequent restatement increases by 10.7%, 
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which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The results of audit opinions in 
Column (3) are consistent with those in Column (1) and (2). Regarding the interactions, 
only those EM_IMPOR_MAT that are conditional on the opinions of OTHER_MAOs 
are statistically significant (p < 0.1). If OTHER_MAOs × EM_IMPOR_MAT increases 
to one unit, the subsequent restatement increases by 8.4%. For the control variables, 
with the exception of both ROA and ISSUE_SHARE with a reduced significance to the 
5% level, all signs and significance levels are the same as the OLS regression for the 
first-step test of (1) – Column (3) of Table 5. 
 To conclude, only one intercept, OTHER_MAOs × EM_IMPOR_MAT, has 
consistent results among the three tests in the baseline model – Column (1), full model 
in logistic regression – Column (2) and OLS regression – Column (3). The result 
implies that EM_IMPOR_MAT conditional on OTHER_MAOs has a stronger 
association with the likelihood of subsequent restatements than other explanations.  
[TABLE 8] 
6.5 Robustness Tests  
?
6.5.1 Using Alternative Regression Models 
I conduct robust tests by using two different models to rerun the regressions of 
tests (1), (2), (3), and (4) and control for unobservable stable/unstable firm-specific 
characteristics that may be correlated with both audit opinions and subsequent 
accounting restatements. The two alternative models are (1) random effects logit 
model and (2) fixed effects logit model. Table 9, Panel A to Panel D, displays the 
results of the robustness checks for tests (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively. Table 9 – 
Panel A shows consistent results with that in the main test (1) where the coefficients 
of MAOs in both the random effects logit model and the fixed effects logit model are 
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positive and significant at the 1% level. Table 9 – Panel B displays results as the same 
direction and significance as that in the main test (2) except the coefficient of 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP is less statistically significant at the 10% level under the fixed 
effects logit model. Similarly, in Table 9 – Panel C and Table 9 – Panel D, the 
coefficient of the independent variables of interest have the same sign of directions as 
that in the main tests (3) and (4), but the level of statistical significance varies in the 
main tests. Overall, the results of the main tests are robust by using alternative models.  
[TABLE 9] 
6.5.2 Partitioning the samples into two subsamples for SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 SOEs and Non-SOEs have significant differences regarding the management 
cultures, company objectives, and so on. Thus, as an additional test, I divide the 
samples into two subsamples for SOEs (12,569 observations, i.e. 55.01%) and Non-
SOEs (10,281 observations, i.e. 44.99%) to see how the association between the audit 
opinions and explanatory notes and the incidence of subsequent restatements changes. 
Table 10, Panel A to Panel D, reports the results for this sensitivity test. Table 10 – 
Panel A shows that MAOs are significantly and positively associated with subsequent 
accounting restatements at 1% level for both SOEs and Non-SOEs under the logistic 
regression model in column (2). In Table 10 – Panel B, column (2), SOEs with 
QUALIFED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and DISCLAIMER have higher likelihood of 
subsequent restatement at significant level of 1%, 1% and 5%, respectively. While for 
the non-SOEs, except the coefficient of UNQUALIFIED_EMP is positive and 
statistically significant at 5%, the remaining three independent variables of interests 
are all positive and statistically significant at 1%. Table 10 – Panel C, reveals that two 
types of explanatory notes – EM_IMPOR_MAT and AUD_RELAT_ISSUE have 
stronger predictive power to report subsequent restatements than other types of 
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explanatory notes for both SOEs and Non-SOEs. Table 10 – Panel D, demonstrates 
that only SOEs with EM_IMPOR_MAT that are conditional on the opinions of 
OTHER_MAOs are statistically significant (p < 0.1) in logistic regression. All in all, 
the results of subsample tests for SOEs and Non-SOEs are consistent with the results 
of main tests, but with generally less significances. Each type of MAO of non-SOEs 
tends to have stronger association with subsequent restatements than that of SOE, yet, 
the explanatory notes of SOEs are generally with higher likelihood of incidence of 
subsequent restatements than those notes of non-SOEs.  
[TABLE 10] 
6.5.3 Focusing on subsamples that without Audit Firm switches  
 When a listed firm receives one of the modified opinions from the auditor, it may 
prevent from the suffering of a higher cost of borrowing, the potential drop in the stock 
price by switching to another audit firm. The listed firm expects to obtain an 
unqualified opinion from the new auditor. At the same time, the new auditor may 
correct misstatement and initiate restatements for the prior year financial statements. 
Therefore, the incidence of subsequent restatements may be partially explained by the 
auditor switch. To examine this situation, I focus on the subsamples (18,598 
observations, i.e. 81.39%) where there is no audit firm switch and see if the 
associations between MAOs together with their explanatory notes and the incidence of 
subsequent restatements hold. Table 11, Panel A to Panel D, presents the results of such 
subsamples for tests (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspondingly. Table 11 – Panel A shows 
consistent results with that in the main test (1) where the coefficients of MAOs are all 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Table 11 – Panel B demonstrates the 
same results in agreement with the main test under the baseline model. While the 
coefficients of UNQUALIFIED_EMP, QUALIFIED, QUALIFIED_EMP, and 
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DISCLAIMER remain all positive under the Logit and OLS models as per the main 
test, but some of their coefficients are with less statistical significance. Concerning the 
predictive power of explanatory notes towards the subsequent accounting restatements, 
the results in Table 11 – Panel C reveal the consistent results with that in the main test, 
except the statistical significances of ACC_POL_INCON under the baseline and Logit 
models and EM_IMPOR_MAT under the OLS model, do not hold. Table 11 – Panel D 
presents that the results of the intercept, OTHER_MAOs x EM_IMPOR_MAT, does not 
hold. To conclude, by concentrating on subsamples of those without auditor switch, 
the associations between MAOs and explanatory notes and subsequent accounting 
restatements in majority still hold, but some of their statistical significance are weaken. 
[TABLE 11] 
6.5.4 Partitioning the samples into two subsamples for Top Ten and Non-Top 
Ten Audit Firms  
 Unlike the audit services in the U.S. market which are dominated by the 
international Big Four accounting firms, audit firms in China are characterized as 
relatively small in scale and with low market shares. Hence, a cross-sectional test to 
partition the samples between listed firms audited by top ten and non-top ten audit 
firms are performed.28 Table 12, Panel A to Panel D, displays the corresponding 
results of this cross-sectional test for top ten audit firms (with 10,434 observations, 
approximately 45.66%) and non-top ten audit firms (12,416 observations, about 
54.34%). Surprisingly, majority of the results for tests on subsamples for top ten audit 
firms do not comply with the results in main tests (1), (2), (3), and (4). Table 12 – Panel 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
28Top ten audit firms are defined as the first ten audit firms which have the highest market shares of the 
audit services in China A-shares firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, using the 
total net assets of the listed firms as the measurement units, on a yearly basis.?
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A, in the subsamples for top ten audit firms, shows that the coefficient of MAOs in 
both logistic with controls and OLS model are positive but not significant. Similarly, 
in table 12 –Panel B, in the subsamples for top ten audit firms, only the coefficient of 
QUALIFIED, is positive and statistically significant at 5% in the logistic with controls 
model, the significances of other types of MAOs do not hold. Also, unlike the results 
in main tests, Table 12 – Panel C reveals that ACC_POL_INCON,
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE, and VIO_APC are significantly associated with subsequent 
restatements at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, for the subsamples of top ten audit 
firms in logistic with controls model. The insignificant results for top ten audit firms 
may be explained by the MAOs allocations. Among the 1,422 MAOs in the total 
samples, more than two-thirds (i.e., 950 instances) are issued by non-top ten audit 
firms, and only around one-third of the MAOs (i.e., 472 instances) are issued by top 
ten audit firms. With few MAOs in the subsamples of top ten audit firms, the power of 
the tests is therefore weakened. In additions, the results may indicate the good audit 
quality of top ten audit firms. Specifically, table 2 – Panel B shows that 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP has insignificant relation with subsequent restatements, but 
QUALIFIED is positively and significantly correlated with subsequent restatements. 
These results demonstrate that the judgment of top ten audit firms in deciding the 
opinion type are highly and effectively reflecting the classifications stated in the 
Chinese Auditing Standards. While for non-top ten audit firms, most of the test results 
are consistent with that in the four main tests. 
[TABLE 12] 
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Chapter 7  Conclusions and Limitations  
?
This thesis examines whether MAOs and the explanatory notes in audit reports 
are informative and can communicate financial misstatement risks to shareholders, 
investors, and the interested general public. In the weak institutional and financial 
reporting environment in China, audit quality has often been questioned in prior 
literature (Wang and Wu 2011). However, auditors in China tend to protect their 
reputation to achieve business continuity and reap the economic benefits of providing 
high-quality audit services. I hypothesize that auditors are able to convey financial 
misstatement risks via audit reports, wherein the more severe the audit opinions, the 
more likely the incidence of subsequent accounting restatements will take place. I also 
hypothesize that explanatory notes provide information content to financial statement 
users, and different explanatory notes carry different predictive powers pertaining to 
financial misstatement risks. My empirical results generated from univariate and 
multivariate regression tests support these hypotheses.  
The results of my thesis add to the growing body of literature on the effects of 
MAOs, the determinants of subsequent accounting restatements, and thus, the financial 
reporting quality. My findings that MAOs are more likely to have subsequent 
accounting restatements than the standard unqualified audit opinions indicate that 
MAOs imply financial misstatement risks. This is the first study in China to discuss 
the usefulness of MAOs from the perspective of accounting restatements, which is 
different from prior studies that examined the effects of MAOs on financial constraints 
(Lin et al. 2011), the impact of going-concern reports on bankruptcy (Lennox 1999), 
and market reactions to MAOs (Pei and Hamill 2013).  
 Second, my findings that explanatory notes in China, including the emphasis of 
important matter and audit-related issues, have positive associations with the 
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subsequent accounting restatements, demonstrate that auditor reports in the current 
financial reporting regime are informative of misstatement risk, which contradicts the 
normal belief of scholars and financial statement users that the current audit reporting 
model is boilerplate. Moreover, the flexibility that the auditors are given to add 
explanatory notes besides audit opinions also reveals the previous auditor reports are 
not as boilerplate as expected. Such findings provide the foundation and consistency 
in support of the changing trends on the new and enhanced auditor reports imposed by 
the standard setters in China in 2016. Effective January 1, 2017, all auditors were 
expected to express key or critical audit matters in audit reports.  
 Third, my findings reveal that the overall audit quality in China is good because 
more severe types of MAOs have higher associations with subsequent accounting 
restatements. In prior studies, “audit quality refers to the quality of the auditor’s 
opinion (i.e., assurance), not the opinion itself.” (DeFond and Zhang 2014). When I 
measure the audit quality, it may not be fair to merely say that having more MAOs 
indicates higher audit quality or vice versa. On the contrary, material misstatement is 
usually one of the proxies in measuring audit quality – the occurrence of material 
misstatements is a strong indication of poor audit quality. Some may argue that if the 
auditors did their jobs well, they should be able to discover and correct accounting 
errors and misstatements in the first place during the audit, and hence, no subsequent 
financial restatements are needed. Subsequent restatements therefore indicate that 
auditors are not conducting a due diligence audit: they are either incompetent at work 
or dependent on clients (Watts and Zimmerman 1981; DeAngelo 1981a; DeAngelo 
1981b). However, this claim neglects to consider that auditors’ decision in issuing 
different types of audit opinions to different firms (where different audit opinions and 
expressions do not carry the same meaning). It may not be reasonable to merely claim 
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that the more the misstatements, the poorer the audit quality. Instead, it is more 
appropriate to comment that the auditor does not do a decent job under the following 
conditions: the auditor expresses an unqualified opinion in favor of a company and the 
company subsequently generates restatements. This is in contrast to the case wherein 
an auditor expresses a qualified opinion for a corporation. In my thesis setting, I 
consider both factors – the types of audit opinions issued by auditors and the incidence 
of subsequent accounting restatements, and test the association between them. In this 
situation, I develop a more meaningful reflection of audit quality. Audit quality is the 
frequency of the subsequent restatements that take place after considering the types of 
audit opinions and explanatory notes, and not the audit opinion or the restatement itself. 
 My thesis focuses on investigating the relationship between MAOs with their 
explanatory notes and financial misstatement risks by measuring the incidence of 
subsequent accounting restatements. I recognize that a U.S. study has further inspected 
the relationship between the explanatory languages in auditor reports and the capital 
market reactions from investors (Czerney et al. 2018). I also recognize that due to data 
unavailability, only a few studies can be presently conducted to examine whether the 
new and enhanced audit reports provide useful and valuable information to 
shareholders and financial statement users. Future research may investigate the above 
issues from the perspective of the China setting, which is a strong representative of 
emerging global markets.  
? ?
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions?
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
RESTATEMENT Equals 1 if firm i's fiscal year t financial statements are with subsequent restatement, 
and 0 otherwise; 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
MAOs Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is unqualified opinion with 
emphasis of matter paragraph or qualified opinion or qualified opinion with 
emphasis of matter paragraph or disclaimer opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is unqualified opinion with 
emphasis of matter paragraph, and 0 otherwise; 
QUALIFIED Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is qualified opinion, and 0 
otherwise;
QUALIFIED_EMP Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is qualified opinion with 
emphasis of matter paragraph, and 0 otherwise; 
DISCLAIMER Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is disclaimer of opinion, and 0 
otherwise;
ACC_POL_INCON Equals 1 if the audit report of firm i's fiscal year t has explanatory note discussed 
accounting policy inconsistency issues, and 0 otherwise; 
EM_IMPOR_MAT Equals 1 if the audit report of firm i's fiscal year t has emphasize important matters, 
and 0 otherwise; 
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE Equals 1 if the audit report of firm i's fiscal year t has discussed auditing related 
issues, and 0 otherwise; 
FIN_DISTRESS Equals 1 if the audit report of firm i's fiscal year t has discussed financial distress 
factors, and 0 otherwise; 
VIO_APC Equals 1 if the audit report of firm i's fiscal year t has identified violations of APC, 
and 0 otherwise; 
OTHER_MAOs Equals 1 if the audit opinion of firm i's fiscal year t is qualified opinion or qualified 
opinion with emphasis of matter paragraph or disclaimer opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
(The table is continued on the next page.) 
69?
?
APPENDIX (continued) 
CONTROL VARIABLES
SIZE The size of the firm i, measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’ market value as 
of the end of fiscal year t; 
AGE The number of years since firm i first appeared in CSMAR, up to and including 
fiscal year t; 
ROA The return on assets of firm i, measured as total profits and financial expenses scaled 
by total assets as of the end of fiscal year t; 
BOOK_MKT The book-to-market ratio of the firm i, measured as  total assets scaled by market 
capitalization as of the end of fiscal year t; 
LEVERAGE The total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
POSITIVE ACCR Equals 1 if firm i 's fiscal year t reported net profits is greater than reported net cash 
flow from operating activities, and 0 otherwise; 
LOSS Equals 1 if firm i 's fiscal year t reported net loss, and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH The differences between the ending total assets and the beginning total assets and 
scaled by beginning total assets of firm i as of the end of fiscal year t; 
ISSUE_SHARE Equals 1 if firm i's fiscal year t issues new shares, and 0 otherwise; 
MERGE_ACQ Equals 1 if firm i's fiscal year t has a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise; 
BIG_FOUR Equals 1 if firm i's fiscal year t is audited by the International Big Four CPA firm, 
and 0 otherwise; 
AUDIT_FEE The natural logarithm of the total audit fees of firm i as of the end of fiscal year t; 
INDEP_DIR The number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors 
(including board chairman) in the firm’s board of directors as of the end of fiscal 
year t; 
BOARD_CHAIR Equals 1 if firm i 's board chairman is the same person of the general manager as of 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; 
SOE Equals 1 if firm i 's ultimate controlling shareholder is a government entity as of 
fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; 
OWNER The percentage of ownership held by the controlling shareholder of firm i as of fiscal 
year t; 
Year Dummies Year dummy of the fiscal year-ends from 2003 to 2015; and 
Industry Dummies Industry dummy, where: IND1 = agriculture, IND2 = mining, IND3 = 
manufacturing, IND4 = utilities, IND5 = construction, IND6 = transportation and 
storage, IND7 = information technology, IND8 = wholesale and retail trade, IND9 = 
finance and insurance, IND10 = real estate, IND11 = social service, IND12 = 
communication and cultural, and IND13 = comprehensive industries. 
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FIGURE 1 – Classification of Audit Opinions
Standard Unqualified Opinion 
Unqualified Opinion with Emphasis 
Matter Paragraph  
Qualified Opinion 
Qualified Opinion with Emphasis Matter 
Paragraph
Adverse Opinion 
Disclaimer Opinion 
Unmodified
Modified
Qualified
Unqualified
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TABLE 1 
Sample Design 
Firm-year observations with requisite data in CSMAR Solution, Wind database and cninfo website 
for 2003 through 2015 25,483 
Less observations which are not A-shares listed in Shanghai and/ or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (2,477)
Less observations for which without financial statement data in the two subsequent years  (139)
Less observations which missing data in any variables  (17)
Final Sample 22,850
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Modified Audit Opinions in China 
Panel A: Types of MAOs by Year (percentage in parentheses) 
Year 
Total 
Number of 
Listed_Co
Unqualif
ied with 
EMP 
(%) 
Qualifi
ed (%) 
Qualifie
d with 
EMP 
(%) 
Disclai
mer (%) 
Total 
Number of 
MAOs (%) 
      
2003  1,235  50 9 10 12  81
(4.05) (0.73) (0.81) (0.97) (6.56)
2004  1,332  67 27 22 17  133
(5.03) (2.03) (1.65) (1.28) (9.98)
2005  1,333  73 42 16 28  159
(5.48) (3.15) (1.20) (2.10) (11.93)
2006  1,420  75 29 8 28  140
(5.28) (2.04) (0.56) (1.97) (9.86)
2007  1,537  89 12 1 15  117
(5.79) (0.78) (0.07) (0.98) (7.61)
2008  1,590  77 16 0 17  110
(4.84) (1.01) (0.00) (1.07) (6.92)
2009  1,686  83 6 7 19  115
(4.92) (0.36) (0.42) (1.13) (6.82)
2010  1,910  82 17 6 6  111
(4.29) (0.89) (0.31) (0.31) (5.81)
2011  2,042  87 12 7 4  110
(4.26) (0.59) (0.34) (0.20) (5.39)
2012  2,109  70 11 1 3  85
(3.32) (0.52) (0.05) (0.14) (4.03)
2013  2,129  57 18 2 5  82
(2.68) (0.85) (0.09) (0.23) (3.85)
2014  2,204  63 16 2 7  88
(2.86) (0.73) (0.09) (0.32) (3.99)
2015  2,323  76 7 5 3  91
(3.27) (0.30) (0.22) (0.13) (3.92)
            
Total  22,850  949 222 87 164  1,422
(4.15) (0.97) (0.38) (0.72) (6.22)
The number of audit reports with an adverse opinion from 2003 to 2015 is nil. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Modified Audit Opinions in China 
Panel B-III: Two Types of MAOs by Details of Explanatory Notes
Types of Explanatory Notes 
Unqualified with 
EMP
 Qualified, Qualified 
with EMP & 
Disclaimer Total 
Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent 
Accounting policy inconsistency 15 1.36%  10 1.13%   25 1.26%
Adoption of new or change in accounting policy 2 0 2
Amendments on financial statements in prior 
financial periods 
9 9 18
Reclassification of accounting items in disclosure 
notes
0 1 1
Change in accounting estimates  4   0     4  
Emphasizing important matters 321 29.16% 170 19.21% 491 24.72%
Emphasizing company mergers and acquisitions  4 3 7
Emphasizing related party transactions 23 15 38
Emphasizing litigation and regulatory activities 9 1 10
Emphasizing managerial material accounting 
estimates 
16 14 30
Emphasizing contingencies and uncertainties 210 109 319
Emphasizing important accounting treatments 34 19 53
Emphasizing contingent liabilities  15 8 23
Emphasizing assets disposal 1 0 1
Emphasizing material investment   9   1     10  
Auditing related issues 27 2.45% 295 33.33% 322 16.21%
Use of other auditor's work 6 8 14
Audit scope limitation 7 269 276
Other supplementary information 3 6 9
Unsolved issues leading MAOs in prior year 
(opening balance) 
2 8 10
Opening balance involving material 
misstatements 
1 3 4
Solved issues leading MAOs in prior year 
(opening balance) 
 8   1     9  
Financial distress 687 62.40% 287 32.43% 974 49.04%
Seriously suspicious on sustainable operations 398 138 536
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 2 Panel B-III (continued)
Types of Explanatory Notes 
Unqualified with 
EMP
Qualified, Qualified 
with EMP & 
Disclaimer Total 
Total Percent Total Percent Total Percent 
Financial difficulties and operation uncertainties 153 84 237
Involve debt restructuring or bankruptcy  136   65     201  
Violation of APC 49 4.45% 122 13.79% 171 8.61%
Accounting treatment inconsistent with APC 9 29 38
Accounting transactions lack original documents 33 46 79
Violation of other regulations 1 15 16
Suspicious accounting practices 0 12 12
Accounting estimates inconsistent with APC and 
unreasonable
 6 15 21
Disclosures inconsistent with APC and related 
regulations
 0   5     5  
Other issues  2 0.18% 1 0.11% 3 0.15%
Audit opinion involves two set of financial 
statements 
1 0 1
Prior financial reports had former certified public 
accountant
1 1 2
Total 1,101 100% 885 100% 1,986 100%
?
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Misstatement 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Misstatement and Audit Opinion 
   
 Without Misstatement With Misstatement 
 Frequency  % Frequency  % Total 
Standard Unqualified Opinion  20,281   94.65% 1,147   5.35% 21,428 
Modified Audit Opinion  1,167  82.07% 255   17.93% 1,422 
 21,448   93.86% 1,402   6.14% 22,850 
Chi-square test         
 Pr= 0.000***         
?
? ?
?? ? ???????
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for Misstatement
Panel B: Misstatement Frequency by Audit Opinion Type    
Audit Opinion Total With Misstatement
frequency frequency %  % Audit Opinion 
Standard Unqualified 21,428 1,147  5.35% 93.78%
Unqualified with EMP 949 120 12.64% 4.15% 
Qualified 222 60 27.03% 0.97% 
Qualified with EMP 87 27 31.03% 0.38% 
Disclaimer 164 48 29.27% 0.72% 
Total 22,850 1,402  6.14% 100.00% 
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TABLE 5 
Association between MAOs and Restatements 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1) 
marginal
eff. (2) 
marginal
eff. (3) 
MAOs ? 1.204*** 9.347% 0.725*** 4.284% 0.052*** 
(12.094) (5.664) (3.702) 
SIZE# ? -0.020 0.021*** 
(0.302) (4.028) 
AGE ? -0.002 -0.044***
(0.197) (2.757) 
ROA ? -0.676 -0.132***
(1.189) (2.590) 
BOOK_MKT# ? 0.210*** 0.022*** 
(3.980) (4.846) 
LEVERAGE ? 0.274* -0.003 
(1.717) (0.156) 
POSITIVE_ACCR ? 0.041 -0.001 
(0.588) (0.291) 
LOSS ? 0.388*** 0.004 
(3.461) (0.449) 
GROWTH ? -0.194* -0.022***
(1.729) (4.096) 
ISSUE_SHARE ? -0.297** -0.011***
(2.503) (2.624) 
MERGE_ACQ + 0.210*** 0.005 
(3.064) (1.203) 
BIG_FOUR - -0.881*** -0.013 
(3.195) (0.757) 
AUDIT_FEE# - -0.182** -0.004 
(2.030) (0.627) 
INDEP_DIR# - -0.110 -0.016 
(0.145) (0.305) 
BOARD_CHAIR ? 0.088 -0.001 
(0.743) (0.129) 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1) 
marginal
eff. (2) 
marginal
eff. (3) 
SOE ? 0.066 -0.005 
(0.673) (0.329) 
OWNER# ? -0.954*** -0.087***
(3.294) (3.461) 
Constant -1.382*** -2.070*** 0.236*** 
(4.903) (3.807) (3.864) 
Observations 22,850 22,850 22,850 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies    YES   YES   YES 
Number of Firms 2,371 
Pseudo R-squared/ (R-squared)   0.065     0.088     (0.031) 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicators are 
included in the model but omitted for brevity. Pseudo R-squared is shown in column (1) and (2); R-squared is 
presented in column (3). 
# Non-missing dummy variables have ?????generated for controls SIZE, BOOK_MKT, AUDIT_FEE, 
INDEP_DIR and OWNER, for capturing the missing value effects of the respective controls.  
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.
?
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TABLE 6 
Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1) 
marginal
eff.  (2) 
marginal
eff.  (3) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP ? 0.849*** 5.784% 0.433*** 2.286% 0.017 
(6.432) (2.717) (1.138) 
QUALIFIED ? 1.701*** 17.176% 1.269*** 9.946% 0.125*** 
(9.453) (6.705) (4.013) 
QUALIFIED_EMP ? 1.741*** 17.996% 1.212*** 9.317% 0.155*** 
(6.523) (4.375) (3.053) 
DISCLAIMER ? 1.692*** 17.068% 0.942*** 6.375% 0.142*** 
(8.132) (3.636) (3.394) 
SIZE# ? -0.024 0.021*** 
(0.354) (3.941) 
AGE ? -0.001 -0.044***
(0.115) (2.805) 
ROA ? -0.497 -0.091* 
(0.863) (1.790) 
BOOK_MKT# ? 0.208*** 0.022*** 
(3.911) (4.918) 
LEVERAGE ? 0.291* -0.006 
(1.755) (0.350) 
POSITIVE_ACCR ? 0.039 -0.001 
(0.550) (0.289) 
LOSS ? 0.379*** 0.004 
(3.361) (0.452) 
GROWTH ? -0.193* -0.021***
(1.705) (4.005) 
ISSUE_SHARE ? -0.288** -0.010** 
(2.424) (2.467) 
MERGE_ACQ + 0.216*** 0.005 
(3.132) (1.375) 
         
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1) 
marginal
eff.  (2) 
marginal
eff.  (3) 
BIG_FOUR - -0.862*** -0.014 
(3.141) (0.791) 
AUDIT_FEE# - -0.193** -0.004 
(2.152) (0.731) 
INDEP_DIR# - -0.107 -0.018 
(0.142) (0.331) 
BOARD_CHAIR ? 0.093 -0.001 
(0.786) (0.088) 
SOE ? 0.087 -0.002 
(0.883) (0.147) 
OWNER# ? -0.961*** -0.088***
(3.323) (3.505) 
Constant -1.429*** -2.004*** 0.245*** 
(5.031) (3.767) (4.059) 
Observations 22,850 22,850 22,850 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies   YES   YES   YES 
Number of Firms 2,371 
Pseudo R-squared/ (R-squared)  0.069     0.090     (0.035) 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicators are included 
in the model but omitted for brevity. Pseudo R-squared is shown in column (1) and (2); R-squared is presented in 
column (3).
# Non-missing dummy variables have been generated for controls SIZE, BOOK_MKT, AUDIT_FEE, INDEP_DIR 
and OWNER, for capturing the missing value effects of the respective controls.  
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively.
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TABLE 7 
Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1)
marginal
eff.  (2) 
marginal
eff. (3)
ACC_POL_INCON ? 1.532** 14.674% 1.481** 12.866% 0.106 
(2.348) (2.049) (1.046) 
EM_IMPOR_MAT ? 0.862*** 6.045% 0.740*** 4.516% 0.044** 
(4.837) (4.122) (1.991) 
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE ?  0.953*** 7.000%  0.658*** 3.882%  0.103*** 
  (5.011)   (3.530)   (3.494) 
FIN_DISTRESS ? 0.582*** 3.566% -0.037 -0.161% -0.001 
(3.732) (0.212) (0.037) 
VIO_APC ? 0.268 1.448% 0.197 0.946% 0.030 
(1.069) (0.784) (0.801) 
SIZE# ? -0.032 0.020*** 
(0.479) (3.771) 
AGE ? -0.001 -0.044***
(0.121) (2.806) 
ROA ? -0.577 -0.111** 
(1.000) (2.233) 
BOOK_MKT# ? 0.185*** 0.020*** 
(3.471) (4.583) 
LEVERAGE ? 0.488*** 0.006 
(2.829) (0.319) 
POSITIVE_ACCR ? 0.051 -0.001
(0.733) (0.198) 
LOSS ? 0.434*** 0.005 
(3.928) (0.578) 
GROWTH ? -0.219* -0.021***
(1.899) (4.086) 
ISSUE_SHARE ? -0.304** -0.011***
(2.555) (2.616) 
MERGE_ACQ + 0.206*** 0.005 
(2.986) (1.222) 
         
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted
sign (1)
marginal
eff.  (2) 
marginal
eff. (3)
BIG_FOUR - -0.850*** -0.013 
(3.122) (0.753) 
AUDIT_FEE# - -0.197** -0.005 
(2.195) (0.834) 
INDEP_DIR# - -0.190 -0.022 
(0.250) (0.398) 
BOARD_CHAIR ? 0.100 -0.001 
(0.848) (0.097) 
SOE ? 0.069 -0.003 
(0.702) (0.212) 
OWNER# ? -0.979*** -0.088***
(3.383) (3.504) 
Constant -1.408*** -2.058*** 0.237*** 
(4.915) (3.778) (3.961) 
   
Observations 22,850 22,850 22,850 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Year Dummies   YES   YES   YES 
Number of Firms    2,371 
Pseudo R-squared/ (R-squared)    0.065    0.089     (0.033) 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicators are 
included in the model but omitted for brevity. Pseudo R-squared is shown in column (1) and (2); R-squared is 
presented in column (3). 
# Non-missing dummy variables have been generated for controls SIZE, BOOK_MKT, AUDIT_FEE, 
INDEP_DIR and OWNER, for capturing the missing value effects of the respective controls.  
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
    
?
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TABLE 8
Association between Explanatory Notes conditional on MAOs and Restatements 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted 
sign (1) 
marginal 
eff.  (2) 
marginal 
eff.  (3) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP ? 1.355*** 11.397% 1.097** 7.665% 0.075* 
(3.288) (2.547) (1.704) 
OTHER_MAOs ? 1.487*** 13.519% 1.121*** 8.076% 0.107** 
(5.019) (3.685) (1.990) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x ACC_POL_INCON ? 0.900 6.438% 1.267 9.948% 0.054 
(1.110) (1.388) (0.388) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x EM_IMPOR_MAT ?  -0.320 -1.320%  -0.267 -1.033%  -0.050 
   (0.854)   (0.695)   (1.253) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE ? -0.077 -0.351% -0.081 -0.339% 0.002 
(0.127) (0.129) (0.022) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x FIN_DISTRESS ? -0.521 -1.992% -0.852** -2.627% -0.064 
(1.293) (2.050) (1.525) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x VIO_APC ? -1.100* -3.274% -1.285** -3.266% -0.058 
(1.905) (2.092) (1.055) 
OTHER_MAOs x ACC_POL_INCON ? 0.696 4.529% 0.614 3.556% 0.067 
(1.063) (0.870) (0.473) 
OTHER_MAOs x EM_IMPOR_MAT ?  0.605** 3.767%  0.608** 3.497%  0.084* 
   (2.249)   (2.253)   (1.719) 
OTHER_MAOs x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE ? 0.194 1.003% 0.101 0.462% 0.032 
(0.762) (0.396) (0.706) 
OTHER_MAOs x FIN_DISTRESS ? -0.210 -0.907% -0.649** -2.141% -0.043 
(0.811) (2.237) (0.876) 
OTHER_MAOs x VIO_APC ? 0.004 0.019% 0.139 0.646% 0.011 
(0.013) (0.463) (0.213) 
SIZE# ? -0.028 0.020*** 
(0.420) (3.793) 
AGE ? -0.003 -0.043*** 
(0.242) (2.782) 
ROA ? -0.624 -0.102** 
(1.078) (2.074) 
BOOK_MKT# ? 0.191*** 0.021*** 
(3.553) (4.673) 
LEVERAGE ? 0.437** 0.002 
(2.550) (0.121) 
(The table is continued on the next page.) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Dependent Variable = RESTATEMENT 
predicted 
sign (1) 
marginal 
eff.  (2) 
marginal 
eff.  (3) 
POSITIVE_ACCR ? 0.043 -0.001 
(0.622) (0.243) 
LOSS ? 0.386*** 0.004 
(3.446) (0.417) 
GROWTH ? -0.207* -0.021*** 
(1.804) (4.064) 
ISSUE_SHARE ? -0.295** -0.010** 
(2.484) (2.535) 
MERGE_ACQ + 0.212*** 0.005 
(3.070) (1.298) 
BIG_FOUR - -0.877*** -0.014 
(3.232) (0.791) 
AUDIT_FEE# - -0.195** -0.005 
(2.171) (0.783) 
INDEP_DIR# - -0.218 -0.022 
(0.285) (0.408) 
BOARD_CHAIR ? 0.093 -0.001 
(0.785) (0.067) 
SOE ? 0.083 -0.002 
(0.847) (0.155) 
OWNER# ? -0.964*** -0.086*** 
(3.324) (3.429) 
Constant -1.425*** -2.049*** 0.238*** 
(5.090) (3.839) (4.017) 
Observations 22,850 22,850 22,850 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES 
Year Dummies   YES   YES   YES 
Number of Firms 2,371 
Pseudo R-squared/ (R-squared)      0.070      0.093     (0.036) 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry indicators are included in the model but 
omitted for brevity. Pseudo R-squared is shown in column (1) and (2); R-squared is presented in column (3). 
# Non-missing dummy variables have been generated for controls SIZE, BOOK_MKT, AUDIT_FEE, INDEP_DIR and OWNER, for 
capturing the missing value effects of the respective controls.  
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Robustness Check 
Panel A: Alternative Models testing the Association between MAOs and Restatements   
(1) (2)
Random Effects 
Logit Model 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Model
   
MAOs 0.676*** 0.486*** 
(5.369) (3.804) 
   
Control Variables Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 22,850 7,465 
Number of Firms   2,371   622 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
   
Panel B: Alternative Models testing the Association between each type of MAO and 
Restatements
(1) (2)
Random Effects 
Logit Model 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Model
   
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 0.387*** 0.252* 
(2.618) (1.688) 
QUALIFIED 1.195*** 0.855*** 
(5.490) (3.942) 
QUALIFIED_EMP 1.225*** 0.924*** 
(3.933) (2.992) 
DISCLAIMER 1.006*** 0.887*** 
(3.675) (3.202) 
   
Control Variables Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 22,850 7,465 
Number of Firms   2,371   622 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Panel C: Alternative Models testing the Association between Explanatory notes and 
Restatements
(1) (2)
Random Effects 
Logit Model 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Model
   
ACC_POL_INCON 1.181* 0.826 
(1.915) (1.362) 
EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.593*** 0.381** 
(3.494) (2.248) 
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.677*** 0.456** 
(3.353) (2.287) 
FIN_DISTRESS -0.018 0.033 
(0.110) (0.202) 
VIO_APC 0.282 0.190 
(1.016) (0.692) 
   
Control Variables Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 22,850 7,465 
Number of Firms   2,371   622 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
   
Panel D: Alternative Models testing the Association between Explanatory notes 
conditional on MAOs and Restatements   
(1) (2)
Random Effects 
Logit Model 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Model
   
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 1.269*** 1.027** 
(2.770) (2.286) 
OTHER_MAOs 1.021*** 0.781** 
(3.036) (2.333) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x ACC_POL_INCON 0.533 0.157 
(0.585) (0.173) 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 9 Panel D (continued) 
(1) (2)
Random Effects 
Logit Model 
Fixed Effects Logit 
Model
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x EM_IMPOR_MAT -0.649 -0.720* 
(1.575) (1.785) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE -0.395 -0.621 
(0.566) (0.938) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x FIN_DISTRESS -0.978** -0.750* 
(2.209) (1.731) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x VIO_APC -1.182* -0.973 
(1.657) (1.369) 
OTHER_MAOs x ACC_POL_INCON 0.600 0.534 
(0.687) (0.616) 
OTHER_MAOs x EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.619** 0.543* 
(2.105) (1.849) 
OTHER_MAOs x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.182 0.054 
(0.633) (0.187) 
OTHER_MAOs x FIN_DISTRESS -0.602** -0.353 
(2.018) (1.185) 
OTHER_MAOs x VIO_APC 0.194 0.070 
(0.593) (0.219) 
   
Control Variables Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 22,850 7,465 
Number of Firms   2,371   622 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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TABLE 11 
Additional Test for using subsample without Auditor Switches 
Panel A: Association between MAOs and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
MAOs 1.094*** 0.658*** 0.041*** 
(9.325) (4.129) (2.761) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Number of Firms         2,368 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
Panel B: Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 0.781*** 0.371* 0.010 
(4.916) (1.912) (0.645) 
QUALIFIED 1.786*** 1.389*** 0.143*** 
(8.258) (5.786) (3.788) 
QUALIFIED_EMP 1.325*** 0.871** 0.088 
(3.793) (2.396) (1.426) 
DISCLAIMER 1.390*** 0.616* 0.088* 
(5.468) (1.838) (1.854) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Number of Firms         2,368 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Panel C: Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit  OLS
ACC_POL_INCON 1.084 0.910 0.028 
(1.269) (1.028) (0.247) 
EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.719*** 0.626*** 0.010 
(3.106) (2.678) (0.425) 
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 1.064*** 0.780*** 0.116*** 
(4.309) (3.180) (3.236) 
FIN_DISTRESS 0.561*** -0.042 0.006 
(3.017) (0.188) (0.336) 
VIO_APC -0.446 -0.491 -0.045 
(1.169) (1.311) (1.243) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Number of Firms         2,368 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
    
?
Panel D: Association between Explanatory Notes conditional on MAOs and 
Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
   
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 0.834* 0.574 0.034 
(1.682) (1.124) (0.714) 
OTHER_MAOs 2.064*** 1.770*** 0.202*** 
(5.717) (4.709) (3.144) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x ACC_POL_INCON 0.885 1.068 -0.001 
(0.774) (0.798) (0.009) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.064 0.151 -0.035 
(0.152) (0.354) (0.797) 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 11 Panel D (continued)
  (1) (2) (3)
  Baseline Logit Logit OLS
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.629 0.647 0.135 
(0.978) (0.982) (1.406) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x FIN_DISTRESS -0.083 -0.407 -0.021 
(0.174) (0.829) (0.457) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x VIO_APC -1.693* -1.769* -0.086* 
(1.666) (1.722) (1.656) 
OTHER_MAOs x ACC_POL_INCON -0.191 -0.350 -0.001 
(0.237) (0.436) (0.005) 
OTHER_MAOs x EM_IMPOR_MAT -0.022 -0.026 -0.036 
(0.064) (0.074) (0.642) 
OTHER_MAOs x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.031 -0.076 0.001 
(0.100) (0.237) (0.026) 
OTHER_MAOs x FIN_DISTRESS -0.655** -1.111*** -0.102* 
(2.017) (2.909) (1.696) 
OTHER_MAOs x VIO_APC -0.719 -0.624 -0.093 
(1.645) (1.414) (1.589) 
   
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 18,598 18,598 18,598 
Number of firms           2,368 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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TABLE 13 
Additional Test for using Sample without Missing Values 
Panel A: Association between MAOs and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
MAOs 1.388*** 0.770*** 0.068*** 
(11.610) (4.884) (4.053) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 17,152 17,152 17,152 
Number of Firms         2,328 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
Panel B: Association between Each Type of MAO and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 1.041*** 0.471** 0.031* 
(6.413) (2.414) (1.697) 
QUALIFIED 1.729*** 1.247*** 0.121*** 
(7.433) (4.929) (3.088) 
QUALIFIED_EMP 2.192*** 1.567*** 0.232*** 
(6.588) (4.679) (3.482) 
DISCLAIMER 1.860*** 0.814** 0.154*** 
(6.468) (2.369) (2.786) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 17,152 17,152 17,152 
Number of Firms         2,328 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
(The table is continued on the next page.) 
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TABLE 13 (continued) 
Panel C: Association between Explanatory Notes and Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
ACC_POL_INCON 2.528*** 2.526*** 0.225* 
(4.729) (3.755) (1.851) 
EM_IMPOR_MAT 1.082*** 0.964*** 0.057** 
(5.101) (4.525) (2.187) 
AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.788*** 0.476* 0.070* 
(2.931) (1.797) (1.809) 
FIN_DISTRESS 0.888*** 0.027 0.037 
(4.790) (0.123) (1.619) 
VIO_APC 0.276 0.211 0.042 
(0.771) (0.608) (0.861) 
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 17,152 17,152 17,152 
Number of Firms         2,328 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
            
Panel D: Association between Explanatory Notes conditional on MAOs and 
Restatements 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
UNQUALIFIED_EMP 1.020* 0.693 0.032 
(1.782) (1.156) (0.485) 
OTHER_MAOs 1.444*** 1.045** 0.117 
(3.597) (2.454) (1.596) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x ACC_POL_INCON 1.492* 1.964** 0.133 
(1.673) (1.972) (0.793) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.066 0.219 -0.012 
(0.112) (0.357) (0.185) 
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 13 Panel D (continued) 
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Logit Logit OLS
   
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE 0.070 -0.059 0.046 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.343) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x FIN_DISTRESS -0.057 -0.557 -0.006 
(0.102) (0.946) (0.095) 
UNQUALIFIED_EMP x VIO_APC -0.263 -0.511 0.045 
(0.426) (0.762) (0.633) 
OTHER_MAOs x ACC_POL_INCON 1.986*** 1.887** 0.371*** 
(3.143) (2.368) (7.754) 
OTHER_MAOs x EM_IMPOR_MAT 0.758** 0.777** 0.088 
(2.050) (2.111) (1.323) 
OTHER_MAOs x AUD_RELAT_ISSUE -0.047 -0.122 -0.036 
(0.139) (0.354) (0.565) 
OTHER_MAOs x FIN_DISTRESS 0.284 -0.397 0.041 
(0.815) (1.048) (0.673) 
OTHER_MAOs x VIO_APC -0.112 0.053 -0.021 
(0.280) (0.132) (0.293) 
   
Control Variables NO YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 17,152 17,152 17,152 
Number of Firms          2,328 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
***,**,* Denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
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